Mercer Law Review
Volume 52
Number 3 Articles Edition - A Symposium:
Ethical Issues in Settlement Negotiations

Article 12

5-2001

Rewriting Near v. Minnesota: Creating a Complete Definition of
Prior Restraint
Michael I. Meyerson

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr
Part of the First Amendment Commons

Recommended Citation
Meyerson, Michael I. (2001) "Rewriting Near v. Minnesota: Creating a Complete Definition of Prior
Restraint," Mercer Law Review: Vol. 52 : No. 3 , Article 12.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr/vol52/iss3/12

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Mercer Law School Digital Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Mercer Law Review by an authorized editor of Mercer Law School Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact repository@law.mercer.edu.

Rewriting Near v. Minnesota:
Creating a Complete Definition of
Prior Restraint
by Michael I. Meyerson*
The Supreme Court's opinion in Near v. Minnesota' was both a major
step on the road to free expression and a missed opportunity. It
represented the first time a law was struck down as violating the First
Amendment's guarantee of free expression. Moreover, it placed the
concept of "prior restraint" at the forefront of the theory of free
expression. As one scholar noted: "Since the 1931 release of the
Supreme Court's opinion in Near v. Minnesota, the doctrine of prior
restraint has been an essential element of first amendment jurisprudence."2
Unfortunately, the Court neither defined prior restraint, nor explained
precisely why injunctions fit within a definition of prior restraint.
Equally regrettable, the Court listed, without explanation, four
exceptions to the prior restraint doctrine, a list that was both over- and
under-inclusive.3
The lack of a generally accepted definition, plus the unprincipled gaps
created by the exceptions, has led to a situation in which the prior
restraint doctrine is increasingly derided by legal scholars and frequent-

* Professor of Law, Piper & Marbury Faculty Fellow, University of Baltimore School
of Law. Hampshire College (B.A., 1976); University of Pennsylvania (J.D., 1979). Support
for this Article was provided by the University of Baltimore School of Law Summer
Research Stipend. I would like to thank Eric Easton and Dan Brenner for their comments
and suggestions. Further, I wish to thank Emily Greenberg, Elizabeth Rhodes, and the
rest of the University of Baltimore School of Law Library Staff for their invaluable
assistance.
1. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
2. Matin Scordato, Distinction Without a Difference: A Reappraisal of the Doctrine of
PriorRestraint, 68 N.C. L. REV. 1, 2 (1989).
3. 283 U.S. at 716.
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ly misunderstood by the Court itself. Many respected commentators
have concluded that the concept of prior restraints marks a "distinction
without a difference." 4 The prior restraint doctrine has been termed, "so
far removed from its historic function, so variously invoked and
discrepantly applied, and so often deflective of sound understanding,
that it no longer warrants use as an independent category of First
Amendment analysis."5
One reason for the strong antipathy some feel for the prior restraint
doctrine* is that it seems to justify the imposition of subsequent
punishments on speech. Ever since Blackstone and the Sedition Act of
1798,6 the heavy hand of censorship was defended on the basis that no
"previous restraint" was involved.7 Because the prior restraint doctrine
is not a substantive protection, it "leaves open the possibility that this
same speech-suppressive activity might be found constitutional if
sufficiently redesigned and recast in the form of a subsequent sanction."8

4. Scordato, supra note 2, at 1.
5. John Calvin Jeffries, Rethinking PriorRestraint, 92 YALE L.J. 409, 437 (1983); see
also Note, PriorRestraint-A Test of Invalidity in Free Speech Cases? 49 COLUM. L. REV.
1001, 1006 (1949) (stating that "[wihatever the value of the prior restraint doctrine in the
past, it has outlived its usefulness"). Not all commentators are ready to give up on the
prior restraint doctrine. See, e.g., Vincent Blasi, Toward a Theory of PriorRestraint: The
Central Linkage, 66 MINN. L. REV. 11 (1981); Howard Hunter, Toward a Better
Understandingof the PriorRestraint Doctrine: A Reply to ProfessorMayton, 7 CORNELL
L. REV. 283, 293-95 (1982).
6. Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 71, 1 Stat. 596 (1798) (expired 1801).
7. See infra text accompanying notes 30 & 33.
8. Martin Redish, The ProperRole of the PriorRestraintDoctrine in FirstAmendment
Theory, 70 VA. L. REV. 53, 54 (1984); see also William T. Mayton, Toward a Theory of First
Amendment Process: Injunctions of Speech, Subsequent Punishment, and the Costs of the
PriorRestraint Doctrine, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 245, 253 (1982) (arguing that "subsequent
punishment is a means of 'prevention' of speech something akin to a previous restraint");
Hans A. Linde, Courts and Censorship, 66 MINN. L. REV. 171, 185-86 (1981) (stating that
subsequent punishment is prior restraint for all practical purposes because "[i]ts object is
to prevent publication, not to impose punishment"); Thomas R. Litwack, The Doctrine of
PriorRestraint, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 519, 521 (1977) (stating that "the threat of
criminal and civil penalties can inhibit arguably protected expression from reaching the
public just as effectively as injunctions or licensing schemes").
A related argument is that the prior restraint doctrine injures free expression because
it encourages subsequent punishments, which are more harmful than injunctions.
Professor Scordato argued:
uniform, impersonal threats, while they may have less of a deterrent effect on any
given individual, will have some influence on every individual in the regulated
community. On the other hand, specific, personal threats, while perhaps more
potent with respect to each targeted individual, are limited in their scope, by
definition, to one, or at the most to a very few, such individuals. The overall

2001]

DEFINITION OF PRIOR RESTRAINT

1089

Such criticism is short-sighted. Unless we inhabit a legal universe
where all speech is protected, the doctrine of prior restraint is essential
for the protection of free speech. As soon as it is conceded that some
speech might be punished, procedural protection becomes essential.
With its distinguished historical pedigree, the prior restraint doctrine
helps to preserve the murky line between protected and unprotected
speech. The most vigorous defense of protected speech is aided by the
secondary shield of the prior restraint doctrine. Moreover, the doctrine
serves to restrain the overuse of arguably permissible censorship by
biased, overly eager, or insensitive government officials.
But this protection is possible only if a critical problem is solved: the
lack of a legal definition of the term "prior restraint." Many share the
frustration of Professor Harry Kalven who bemoaned in 1971, "it is not
altogether clear just what a prior restraint is or just what is the matter
with it."9
In his classic 1955 study of prior restraint, Professor Thomas Emerson
wrote that "despite an ancient and celebrated history, the doctrine of
prior restraint remains today curiously confused and unformed." °
Amazingly, that situation remains today. The result has been the
purpose for the prior restraint doctrine has been obscured, a consistent
and predictable application of the doctrine has been impossible, and the
utility of the doctrine has been diminished.
Without a definition, prior restraint has frequently degenerated into
nothing more than a "category label."" It can become almost a game
for attorneys defending speakers to affix the label of prior restraint on

societal impact of such specific, personal threats, given the large number of
individuals in society, is quite small indeed.
Scordato, supra note 2, at 14; see also Mayton, supra note 8, at 246 (stating that "the
preference for subsequent punishment over injunctive relief diminishes the exercise of free
speech by burdening it with costs that seem not yet comprehended").
This is an intriguing argument, but it relies on the mathematically unresolvable question
of whether a weak threat to many impacts speech more than a strong threat to a few. One
problem is the extent of the different threats are unquantifiable, so comparison of total
harm is impossible. Recognizing both prior restraints and subsequent punishment are
harmful to free expression, I prefer to oppose them both, and, if truly forced to choose,

prefer the security of the historically based doctrine of prior restraints.
9.

Harry Kalven, The Supreme Court 1970 Term-Foreword: Even When a Nation Is

at War, 85 HARv. L. REV. 3, 32 (1971).
10. Thomas Emerson, The Doctrineof PriorRestraint, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 648,
649 (1955); see also Jeffries, supra note 5, at 420 (stating that "[tihe lack of settled content
in the term 'prior restraint' is, by now, painfully obvious").
11. Scordato, supra note 2, at 30.
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whatever law is being challenged.'" Often, the game can be successful.
As Professor Laurence Tribe has noted, the Supreme Court "has often
used the cry of 'prior restraint' not as an independent analytical
framework but rather to signal conclusions that it has reached on other
grounds." 3
In this Article, I will attempt to complete the unfinished task of
Near-the creation of a comprehensive definition of prior restraint and
a reasoned explanation of the exceptions. The heart of this new
definition comes from the realization that, at its core, the doctrine of
prior restraint embodies not only principles of free speech, but of
separation of powers as well. While the dangers from a prior restraint
are the same regardless of the branch from which it emanates, the
method for preventing this harm will be different by necessity. Thus,
when regulating speech, each branch of government is restricted in
terms of timing in regard both to the communication itself and to the
actions of the other branches of government.
Separation of powers has always been a critical, if indirect, mechanism
for preserving individual liberty. As Justice Kennedy remarked, "Liberty
is always at stake when one or more branches seek to transgress the
separation of powers." 4 Nowhere is that more true than in the
doctrine of prior restraint.
The inclusion of principles of separation of powers permits, for the first
time, the creation of a workable definition of prior restraint. Once this
definition has been given, two facts become clear. First, the doctrine of
priorrestraint can be easily and consistently applied to a wide range of
speech-related issues. Second, preservation of the prior restraint
doctrine is critically important for the protection of free expression.
I.

A NEAR-GREAT DECISION

In Near the Supreme Court ruled a Minnesota law that permitted the
government to obtain a court order abating defamatory newspapers as
a "nuisance" created an unconstitutional prior restraint. 5 The opinion,
12. First Amendment expert Floyd Abrams once told a symposium that "he was very
tempted as an advocate, to characterize anything having the vaguest semblance to a prior
restraint as a prior restraint, since prior restraints are somewhat of a taboo." Donald
Gilmore, Prologue (for "Near v. Minnesota 50th Anniversary Symposium"), 66 MINN. L.
REV. 1, 8 (1981).
13. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1988), §§ 12-34, at
1040; see also Jeffries, supra note 5, at 413 (referring to the "latent plasticities" of the prior
restraint doctrine).
14. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 450 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring).

15. 283 U.S. at 706. The state obtained an injunction from a state court barring The
Saturday Press from publishing or distributing "any publication whatsoever which is a
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written by Chief Justice Hughes, declared "it has been generally, if not
universally, considered that it is the chief purpose of the guaranty [of6
liberty of the press] to prevent previous restraints upon publication."
Instead of defining what made a particular regulatory scheme a prior
restraint, the Court focused on the statute's "operation and effect." 7
Noting the "object and effect" of the statute was to "suppress" future
publication, the Court described the operation of the statute as putting
"the publisher under an effective censorship."8
According to the Court, the primary offending feature of the statute
was that upon a finding that a publisher had distributed a "malicious,
scandalous or defamatory" newspaper, the "resumption of publication
[was] punishable as a contempt of court by fine or imprisonment." 9
The Court's injunction "would lay a permanent restraint upon the
publisher, to escape which he must satisfy the court as to the character
of a new publication." ° Whether future publications would be free
from punishment would depend upon whether the publisher was able "to
satisfy the judge that the charges are true and are published with good
motives and for justifiable ends."2 ' This, explained the Court, "is of the
essence of censorship."22
The Court stated, though, that the constitutional ban on prior
restraint was not "absolutely unlimited" but was subject to limitation "only in exceptional cases."23 The Court listed four such cases:24
1) "actual obstruction to [the Government's] recruiting service or the
publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number and location
of troops;"25 2) "the primary requirements of decency ... against

malicious, scandalous or defamatory newspaper, as defined by law." Id. That court noted
The Saturday Press was not barred from all publishing; it was still permitted to operate
"a newspaper in harmony with the public welfare to which all must yield." Id. For the
classic description of The Saturday Press and the Near case, see FRED W. FRIENDLY,
MINNESOTA RAG: THE DRAMATIC STORY OF THE LANDMARK SUPREME COURT CASE THAT

GAVE NEW MEANING TO FREEDOM OF PRESS N.Y.: Random House (1981).
16. 283 U.S. at 713. For its description of "the conception of the liberty of the press as
historically conceived and guaranteed," the Court cited both Blackstone and DeLolme. Id.
at 713-14.
17. Id. at 708.

18. Id. at 712.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 713.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 716.
24. Id.
25. Id. These were the paradigms for permissible war-time prior restraints: "When
a nation is at war many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance
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obscene publications;"2" 3) "incitements to acts of violence and the
overthrow by force of orderly government... words that may have all
the effect of force;"27 and 4) "[protection of] private rights according to
the principles
governing the exercise of the jurisdiction of courts of
28
equity."

The Court added an additional exception, stating the ban on private
restraints would not prevent a court, in a proper case, from using its
traditional contempt powers over those who interfere directly with the
operation of the court: "There is also the conceded authority of courts to
punish for contempt when publications directly tend to prevent the
proper discharge of judicial functions."29
The primary weakness in the Near decision comes from its failure to
define precisely what will constitute a prior restraint. There is no
overarching principle to help evaluate future complicated regulatory
attempts. Moreover, the listed exceptions appear nothing more than an
ad hoc enumeration rather than part of a reasoned doctrine.
II.

SEPARATION OF POWERS AND THE DEFINITION OF PRIOR
RESTRAINT

The most famous eighteenth-century discussion of prior restraint, Sir
William Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England, ° also does
not provide a definition of that which it condemns. Rather, Blackstone
announced the distinction between "prior restraints" and "subsequent
punishment" and explained that subsequent punishment for libels is
consistent with his view of liberty of the press:
The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state:
but this consists in laying no previous restraints upon publications, and
not in freedom from censure for criminal matter when published.
Every freeman has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he
pleases before the public: to forbid this, is to destroy the freedom of
the press: but if he publishes what is improper, mischievous, or illegal,
he must take the consequences of his own temerity.3'

to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight and that no Court
could regard them as protected by any constitutional right." Id. at 716 (quoting Schenck
v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919)).
26. Id.

27. Id.
28. Id.

29. Id. at 715.
30. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (1769).
31. Id. at 151-52.
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While this statement does indicate the general English opposition to
previous restraints, it does not actually say what constitutes such a
Blackstone merely contrasts previous restraints with
restraint.
punishments that are imposed after someone "publishes what is
improper, mischievous, or illegal."32 Later in this same section, he
discusses the press licensing of the previous century, but instead of
describing the full array of impermissible previous restraints, he simply
33
contrasts such licensing with the concept of subsequent punishment.
Thus, Blackstone never directly addresses the extent to which judicial
orders should or should not be viewed as previous restraints. Significantly, his description of the remedy for a libel pointedly omits any
reference to injunctive relief: "The punishment of such libellers, for
either making, repeating, printing, or publishing the libel, is fine, and
such corporal punishment as the court in their discretion shall inflict;
34
regarding the quantity of the offense, and the quality of the offender."
The lesson from Blackstone, then, is merely that previous restraints,
such as licensing, violate liberty of the press. It is necessary to turn
elsewhere for a fuller description of what was encompassed by the term
"previous restraint."
In his classic nineteenth-century treatise on constitutional law, Justice
Joseph Story described liberty of the press in the following way:
"[N]either the courts of justice, nor other persons, are authorized to take
notice of writings intended for the press; but are confined to those, which
are printed."35 This description accurately captures the reality [and the
framers' understanding] that the dangers of prior restraints can come
from either judges or licensors.36 The description is not complete,

32. Id. at 152.

33. Blackstone wrote:
To subject the press to the restrictive power of the censor, as was formerly done,

both before and since the revolution, is to subject all freedom of sentiment to the
prejudices of one man, and make him the arbitrary and infallible judge of all
controverted points in learning, religion, and government. But to punish (as the
law does at present) any dangerous or offensive writings, which when published,
shall on a fair and impartial trial be adjudged of a pernicious tendency, is
necessary for the preservation of peace and good order....

Id. at 153.
34. Id. at 151.
35.

3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION

§

1879 (1833).

This

description is essentially the same as DeLolme gave of the English view of liberty of the
press in 1775. JAMES DELOLME, THE CONSTITUTION OF ENGLAND 254 (John MacGregor,

ed., 1853) (1775).
36. See Michael I. Meyerson, The Neglected History of the Prior Restraint Doctrine:
Rediscovering the Link Between the FirstAmendment and the Separationof Powers, 34 IND.

L. REV. 1 (2001).
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though, because it leaves out the component so many others have
missed. The description overlooks the difference between restraints
emanating from "the courts of justice" and those emanating from "other
persons.""7 Specifically, the description omits the fundamental differences between restraints emanating from the judicial, as opposed to the
executive, branch of government.
The critical element of finally solving the puzzle of defining prior
restraint is the recognition that the same constitutional harm will
necessitate different safeguards, depending on which branch of government is inflicting the injury. Both the executive branch, through the
discretionary granting of permits or the creation of licensing boards, and
the judicial branch, through injunction, can create the evil of prior
restraint. But in a system of government in which the judiciary is
supreme, the methods for preventing executive encroachment on freedom
are different from those for preventing judicial encroachment. In
particular, one of the primary ways to prevent executive over-reaching
is with judicial review. However, the fundamental protection against
judicial over-reaching in our constitutional system is structural. Judicial
action is limited to a specified role at a specified time in any particular
only
case. The court does not resolve disputes that it institutes itself but
38
those brought by either the executive branch or private parties.
The concept of prior restraint, thus, has two distinct components: one
temporal, the other embodying the principle of separation of powers.
This is not the separation of powers principle at stake in the Pentagon
Papers case involving congressional authorization of presidential
activity.39 Rather, this is the literal separating of power described in
The FederalistPapers:
"When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same
person or body," says [Montesquieul, "there can be no liberty, because
apprehensions may arise lest THE SAME monarch or senate should
ENACT tyrannical laws to EXECUTE them in a tyrannical manner."

37. Id.
38. According to Alexander Hamilton, the judicial branch, "can take no active resolution
whatever." THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). As Justice Scalia has noted,

the Judicial Branch is "powerless to act except as invited by someone other than itself."
Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W. N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 393 (1997) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
see also Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145 (1979) (stating that liberty is protected by

"[a] reasonable division of functions between law enforcement officers, committing
magistrates, and judicial officers").

39. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 742 (1971) (Marshall, J.,
concurring) (stating, "It would, however, be utterly inconsistent with the concept of
separation of powers for this Court to use its power of contempt to prevent behavior that
Congress has specifically declined to prohibit.").
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Again: "Were the power of judging joined with the legislative, the life
and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control, for
THE JUDGE would then be THE LEGISLATOR. Were it joined to the
JUDGE might behave with all the violence of
executive power, THE
40
AN OPPRESSOR."
Each branch has a specifically delineated, independent role before
punishment is inflicted. Each branch's role is easier to understand by
starting with a picture of a permissible subsequent punishment. This in
no way contradicts the reality that in a free society, most restrictions on
speech, whether prior restraint or subsequent punishment, are
unconstitutional. But, as the doctrine of prior restraint presupposes a
sphere of permissible subsequent punishment, visualizing the distinction
is essential.4 ' In those rare cases in which a subsequent punishment
42
First, the
is permitted at all, it must follow the traditional time-line:
or
speech
prohibited
the
defining
law
legislature enacts a general
43
prohibition.
common-law
conduct. For states, this could also be a
Second, the speech is communicated. Third, the executive branch
enforces the law by initiating legal proceedings, arresting the alleged law
breaker, or filing a complaint in court. For a private action, such as libel
or invasion of privacy, the individual who is alleging harm institutes the
legal proceedings. Finally, the judicial branch rules on the legality of
the communication. This includes jury determinations of guilt, fault for
libel, and community standards for obscenity. Upon a finding of
illegality, the punishment is prison or fine for a criminal offense and
44
damages for a civil violation.
Fundamentally, therefore, the only governmental activity relating to
speech permitted "prior" to communication is that of the legislature
45
Such a rule, subject to the substantive limits
creating a general rule.
of the First Amendment, could penalize such areas as defamation,
obscenity, and breaches of the peace. There is no role for either the
executive branch or the judicial branch at the creation of a general rule;
both are barred from taking action on expression before communication.

40. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 303 (James Madison) (Mentor Book 1961).
41. See, e.g., Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993), referring to "the
distinction, solidly grounded in our cases, between prior restraints and subsequent
punishments."
42. See generally, INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
43. In 1812 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that there was no common-law jurisdiction
in the federal courts. United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. 32, 34 (1812).
44. See Meyerson, supra note 36.
45. Obviously, the general rule must precede the communication. If a general rule was
applied to communication that had already occurred, it would be an unconstitutional ex
post facto law.
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Once expression is communicated, the legislature, of course, has no
further role. The next governmental actor is the executive branch; police
may arrest and prosecutors or government attorneys may file complaints. In the case of private causes of action, such as defamation,
private citizens may initiate law suits.
Finally, in response to these filings, the courts decide the case. With
the jury making the appropriate decisions, the courts rule directly on
whether the expression is constitutionally protected and whether it
violated the law.
With this structure in mind, a two-part definition for prior restraint
can be articulated: (1) A prior restraint occurs whenever judges or
executive branch personnel are authorized to take notice of specific
expression intended for communication rather than that which has
actually been communicated. (2) For those rare cases when the
Constitution permits the regulation of expression before it is communicated, a prior restraint also occurs if either (a) the judiciary can initiate
enforcement or delimit the speech that is prohibited; or (b) the executive
can make a final determination of illegality.
To summarize, the doctrine of prior restraint restricts the ability of all
three branches of government to regulate expression. Each branch is
prohibited from either (a) restricting specific speech or speakers prior to
communication or (b) formulating or implementing rules on speech other
than in that branch's appropriate constitutional chronological order.
The vast majority of Supreme Court cases dealing with prior restraint
fit comfortably within this definition.46 The Supreme Court has
repeatedly struck down prior restraints emanating from the judicial
branch, in the form of injunctions, and the executive branch, in the form
of either a grant of unlimited discretion or the lack of adequate
procedures for determining what speech is unprotected by the Constitution.
A.

Injunctions as a PriorRestraint

In several cases following Near, the Supreme Court struck down
injunctions against speakers as unconstitutional prior restraints. While
these cases do not define prior restraint, they seemed to proceed on the
assumption that whatever a prior restraint was, the particular
injunction involved belonged in that category.

46. There have been a few notable exceptions when the Court has misunderstood and

misinterpreted the prior restraint doctrine. For the major cases that fall outside this
definition, see infra text accompanying notes 71-80.
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In 1971, the Supreme Court denied a government request for an
injunction against the publication of the Pentagon Papers by the New
York Times and The Washington Post.4 7 While each Justice wrote a
separate opinion, the brief per curiarn opinion for the Court focused
entirely on the issue of prior restraint.48 Quoting earlier cases, the
Court stated that there is a "heavy presumption against" the constitutional validity of any system of prior restraint and that the government,
therefore, has "a heavy
burden of showing justification for the imposition
49
of such a restraint."
No opinion spoke for a majority as to precisely why the "heavy burden"
was not met. The view that probably comes closest to a majority
analysis came from Justice Stewart's concurring opinion, stating a prior
restraint was impermissible if disclosure would not "surely result in
direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to our Nation or its
people."50 Because the government could establish only a possibility of
harm, the injunction was denied.5 As Justice Brennan wrote, "the
First Amendment tolerates absolutely no prior judicial restraints of the
press predicated upon surmise or conjecture that untoward consequences
may result."52
The next major Supreme Court case on injunctions as prior restraints
occurred in the 1976 case of Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart.53 A state
trial judge, in a widely reported murder trial, entered an order
prohibiting the publishing or broadcasting of "confessions or ... facts
strongly implicative of the accused."5 4 In striking down this order, the
Court declared that "prior restraints on speech and publication are the
most serious and the least tolerable infringement on First Amendment

47. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971). The "Pentagon
Papers" were a history of America's involvement in the Vietnam conflict.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 714 (quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963) and
Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971)).

50. Id. at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice White joined this opinion, and Justice
Brennan's concurrence used almost precisely the same language: "[OQnly governmental
allegation and proof that publication must inevitably, directly, and immediately cause the
occurrence of an event kindred to imperiling the safety of a transport already at sea can
support even the issuance of an interim restraining order." Id. at 726-27 (Brennan, J.,
concurring). Justice Black, in an opinion joined by Justice Douglas, wrote, "I agree
completely that we must affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia ...Circuit Court of Appeals... for the reasons stated by my Brothers Douglas

and Brennan." Id. at 715 (Black, J., concurring).
51. Id. at 714.
52. Id. at 725-26 (Brennan, J., concurring),
53. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
54. Id. at 541.
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rights."55 The Court did not say, however, that a prior restraint could
never be issued to protect a fair trial against adverse publicity.5" Trial
judges would be permitted to order such a restraint only if (1) there was
extensive pretrial news coverage; (2) the restraining order would actually
be effective; and, most significantly,5 (3)
no other measures could mitigate
7
the effects of the pretrial publicity.
The Court did announce one absolute bar to prior restraint.58 The
Court declared that the press could never be restrained from publishing
information revealed in open court: "[Oince a public hearing had been
held, what transpired there could not be subject to prior restraint." 9
The 1990 case of United States v. Noriega60 signaled a potentially
serious erosion of the protection against prior restraint. Although the
Supreme Court merely denied certiorari, Noriega is significant both
because of the error made by the lower courts and because the Supreme
Court permitted a prior restraint to continue."'

55. Id. at 559.
56. Id. at 569-70.
However difficult it may be, we need not rule out the possibility of showing the
kind of threat to fair trial rights that would possess the requisite degree of
certainty to justify restraint. This Court has frequently denied that First
Amendment rights are absolute and has consistently rejected the proposition that
a prior restraint can never be employed.
Id.
57. Id. at 562. Among the alternate measures given were (a) change of venue; (b)
postponement; (c) voir dire of prospective jurors; (d) "emphatic and clear" jury instructions;
and (5) sequestration of jurors. Id. at 563-64. The Court also referred to proposals to limit
what attorneys and witnesses can say about a pending trial but specifically declined to
discuss the constitutionality of such a limit. Id. at 564. The Court stated, "At oral
argument petitioners' counsel asserted that judicially imposed restraints on lawyers and
others would be subject to challenge as interfering with press rights to news sources ....
We are not now confronted with such issues." Id. at 564 n.8.
58. Id. at 568.
59. Id.; see also Oklahoma Publ'g Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308,310 (1977) (stating
that "the First and Fourteenth Amendments will not permit a state court to prohibit the
publication of widely disseminated information obtained at court proceedings which were
in fact open to the public").
60. 917 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. den. sub nom. CNN, Inc. v. Noriega, 498 U.S.
976 (1990). Judge Hoeveler explained his reason for originally issuing the injunction in his
decision that ended the restraint. United States v. Noriega, 752 F. Supp. 1045, 1049 (S.D.
Fla. 1990). CNN was found in criminal contempt in 1994. United States v. CNN, 865 F.
Supp. 1549, 1564 (S.D. Fla. 1994).
61. An example of this harm can be seen in the extraordinary decision of the South
Carolina Supreme Court upholding a court order banning broadcast of a videotaped
conversation between a criminal defendant and his attorney on the grounds that it was
necessary to "avoid the potential prejudice." State-Record Co. v. South Carolina, 504
S.E.2d 592, 599 (S.C. 1998). The South Carolina court stated its decision to uphold the
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The case began on November 7, 1990, when Manuel Noriega filed an
emergency motion seeking to enjoin CNN from broadcasting tape
recordings of his attorney-client conversations. 2 On November 8, the
trial judge, Judge William Hoeveler, entered a temporary restraining
order prohibiting CNN from broadcasting Noriega's attorney-client
conversations until the court could review the tapes. The judge also
ordered CNN to produce the tapes for the court's review. CNN
immediately appealed the court's restraining order to the Eleventh
Circuit and for the next two days, while its appeal to the Eleventh
Circuit was pending, repeatedly broadcasted tapes of one attorney-client
conversation. 3
On November 10, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the district court's
temporary injunction and ordered CNN to turn over its tapes.64 CNN
then filed an application to stay the restraining order and a petition for
writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court.65 Both were
denied on November 18, 1990, over the dissent of Justices Marshall and
O'Connor.6" Two days later, CNN delivered copies of its tapes to the
court. On November 28, after reviewing the tapes, Judge Hoeveler lifted
the restraining order.67 In 1994 CNN was found guilty of criminal
contempt and agreed to pay $85,000 and read an on-air apology written
by Judge Hoeveler. 5

restraint "is bolstered by the uncertainty... created by the decisions of the District Court,
and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in United States v. Noriega." Id. at 598.
62. 917 F.2d at 1546. The recordings were made by officials at the Metropolitan
Correction Center ("MCC") where Noriega was incarcerated. Noriega had learned CNN
possessed at least one attorney-client conversation when, after asking Frank Rubino,
Noriega's lead counsel, for an interview, CNN personnel appeared at Rubino's office and
played a tape of a conversation between Noriega and certain members of his defense team.
The conversation involved, among other things, a discussion of two potential government
witnesses in Noriega's criminal prosecution. CNN notified defense counsel it possessed
seven tape recordings containing several of Noriega's conversations made from MCC and
that it intended to broadcast the conversations on national television. 865 F. Supp. at
1551.
63. Id. at 1544-46; see also 865 F. Supp. at 1551.
64. 865 F. Supp at 1551.

65. 498 U.S. 976, 976 (1990).
66. Id.
67. David Johnson, Noriega TranscriptIs Made Public, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1990, at
A26. The New York Times reported that besides the banal, the transcripts revealed
conversations that "were almost indecipherable to an outsider." Id.
68. CNN Is Sentenced for TapesAnd Makes PublicApology, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1994,
at B7. The judge-written apology read by CNN stated,
On November 1, 1994, the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Florida found CNN guilty of criminal contempt after a trial. The court held
CNN in contempt because CNN broadcast tape recordings of General Manual
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The lower courts' mistakes stem from their starting point. The court
began by applying the test announced in Nebraska Press that "requires
a factual inquiry" on whether publication would impair the right to a
fair trial and whether less restrictive alternatives are available. 9 The
court reasoned that if a factual inquiry was needed, the press must be
silenced by "a temporary restraint... [to] permit this court to make a
determination based on the merits." °
The flaw in this reasoning is that it appears to circumvent the heavy
presumption against prior restraints by simply terming them "temporary." Historically, as in New York Times and Nebraska Press, the
Supreme Court has required those seeking to impose a prior restraint to
demonstrate the likelihood of harm with a "high degree of certainty.""'
By contrast, the Eleventh Circuit placed no burden on Noriega before
upholding the preliminary restraint. In fact, the court headed its
discussion of the temporary injunction: "The District Court's Obligation
When Confronted With Allegations Of Prejudicial Publicity."72 Similarly, Judge Hoeveler stated that the mere "possibility of prejudicial
disclosure" was sufficient to justify the restraint.73
The failure to require a threshold showing cannot be justified by a
supposed distinction between "permanent" and "temporary" restraints.
As the Supreme Court stated in Alexander v. United States,74 "[tiemporary restraining orders and permanent injunctions-i.e., court orders
that actually forbid speech activities-are classic examples of prior
restraints."7 5 After all, the restraint struck down in Nebraska Press
was not a permanent gag order but applied only until a jury was impan-

Noriega's telephone conversations with his attorney in November 1990. CNN's
broadcast of these recordings violated an explicit order of the United States
District Court not to broadcast.
On further consideration, CNN realizes that it was in error in defying the order
of the court and publishing the Noriega tape while appealing the court's order.
We do now and always have recognized that our justice system cannot long
survive if litigants take it upon themselves to determine which judgments or
orders of court they will or will not follow. Ours is a nation of laws under which
the very freedoms we espouse can be preserved only if those laws are observed.
In the event unfavorable judgments are rendered, the right of appeal is provided.
This is the course on which we should have relied. We regret that we did not.

Id.
69. Noriega, 752 F. Supp. at 1049.

70. 917 F.2d at 1547.
71. 403 U.S. at 714.
72. 917 F.2d at 1547 (emphasis added).
73. 752 F. Supp. at 1049.
74. 509 U.S. 544 (1993).

75. Id. at 550.
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eled.7 s Thus, a preliminary injunction, even one eventually lifted as in
Noriega, poses the same threat to First Amendment freedoms as the
traditional presumptively invalid restraint.
Moreover, it is incorrect to justify the preliminary restraint as
preserving the status quo. As Professor Rodney Smolla has noted, the
legal status quo is that "CNN had a right to broadcast information in its
possession at any moment it chose."77
Therefore, courts must treat preliminary restraints, like all other prior
restraints, as presumptively unconstitutional and require a threshold
showing before any preliminary restraint is issued.7" Those seeking the
restraint must present clear and convincing evidence they will be able
to show the release of the information poses "an imminent, not merely
a likely, threat to the administration of justice. The danger must not be
remote or even probable; it must immediately imperil."79 Next, a trial
court should be required to explore all alternatives to both preliminary
restraints and to production orders. Finally, any request for a preliminary restraint or production order must be supported by proof that the
desired restraint on the merits will effectively prevent the harm
feared. 0

76. 427 U.S. at 539; see also Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347,373 (1976) (plurality opinion)
(stating, "The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time,

unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.").
77.

RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH 15-39 (1997).

78. This was the basis of Justices Marshall and O'Connor's dissent. CNN, Inc. v.
Noriega, 498 U.S. at 976 (Marshall & O'Connor, JJ., dissenting) (stating that "the issue
raised by this petition is whether a trial court may enjoin publication of information alleged
to threaten a criminal defendant's right to a fair trial without any threshold showing that
the information will indeed cause such harm and that suppression is the only means of
averting it"). The dissent concluded that, indeed, if no such showing was required under
Nebraska Press, "it is imperative that we re-examine the premises and operation of
Nebraska Press itself." Id.
79. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 376 (1947).
80. If such a standard had been applied to the Noriega tapes case, the preliminary
restraint would in all likelihood never have been issued. Most critically, Noriega's lawyer
was permitted to raise the specter of prejudicial publicity without any justification beyond
the talismanic recital of attorney-client privilege. If required to make a threshold showing,
the lawyer would have been forced to concede, at least, that the actual tape he heard posed
absolutely no threat of prejudicial publicity. If asked, he would have informed the court
all he heard was Noriega stating he did not recognize the name of a potential witness.

Such statements obviously pose no risk of tainting a jury pool. Certainly no restraint of
any kind could have been justified to bar the playing of that particular tape.
Moreover, exploring alternatives to the production order would have alleviated the
problem. Before issuing the production order, the court should have considered a
procedure similar to that suggested belatedly by CNN after the adverse Eleventh Circuit
ruling. If both CNN and the Government had turned over lists of the tapes they had, it
would have revealed every tape Judge Hoeveler wanted to hear was already in government
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Noriega presented a related issue: a production order requiring the
tapes of the conversations be turned over to a judge for evaluation.
From the days of the Star Chamber, censorship regimens have required
printers to produce their writings for the government's pre-approval."'
Prescreening permits censors to intimidate and silence speakers. Any
effective legal protection against prior restraints must encompass strict
safeguards against production orders. As Justice (then Judge) Kennedy
wrote in overturning a production order, "[T]he press may not be
required to justify or defend what it prints or says until after the
expression takes place."8 2
That case involved a prisoner, Stanley Goldblum, convicted of
securities and insurance fraud, who sought to prevent the broadcast of
a movie about his crime. Goldblum argued that the film might
jeopardize his possibility for parole and his ability to receive a fair trial
both in a pending civil suit and in possible future criminal actions. A
federal district judge ordered NBC to produce a copy of the film so that
it could be reviewed for "inaccuracies." 3 The next day the court of
appeals vacated the order.84
According to then-Judge Kennedy, the order for production of the tapes
posed a two-pronged risk to freedom of expression. First, it created "a
reasonable apprehension of an impending prior restraint."8 5 Second,
the order threatened "interference with the editorial process."86 The
First Amendment required that the production order be struck down
because "[an order thus aimed toward prepublication censorship is an
inherent threat to expression, one that chills speech."87
A production order is qualitatively different from a warrant demanding production of information. Such a warrant is part of an investigation for criminal evidence. By contrast, "[tihe express and sole purpose
of the district court's order to submit the film for viewing by the court
was to determine whether or not to issue an injunction suspending its

hands. Thus, the Government, not the press, would have been required to produce the
tapes.
The problem of the release of privileged information could also have been addressed by
alternatives to prior restraint. Simply requiring the sequesteration of the prosecutorial
staff, as was ordered after the tapes were given to the court, would have alleviated the
unique danger of disclosing attorney-client discussions.
81. See Meyerson, supra note 36.
82. Goldblum v. NBC, 584 F.2d 904, 907 (1978).
83. Id. at 905-06.
84. Id. at 906.

85. Id. at 907.
86. Id.
87. Id.

20011

DEFINITION OF PRIOR RESTRAINT

1103

broadcast.""8 A court must recognize the common constitutional threat
posed by a production order and the ultimate restraint being sought:
"The order to produce the film in aid of a frivolous application for a prior
restraint suffers the constitutional deficiencies of the application for an
injunction. "
Interestingly, if the Noriega court had issued a production order, not
for the purpose of considering a restraint on CNN, but instead to
determine what alternatives were available for preserving a fair trial,
the order would be easier to defend. With the taint of prior restraint
removed, the order would not create the impermissible chilling effect
from government intrusion into the editorial process.
B.

Unlimited Executive Discretion
When those administering a registration or licensing system are given
unlimited discretion over speakers, the dangers of nonreviewable
censorship are unacceptable. Thus, regulation involving leafletting, °
parades, 9 charity solicitation, 92 and the placement of newspaper
vending machines93 have all been declared unconstitutional when those
in charge could select which communicators would be favored and which
would be silenced.
The Supreme Court has given two main reasons why, in "the absence
of narrowly drawn, reasonable and definite standards for the officials to
follow,"' freedom of expression is harmed: "self-censorship by speakers
in order to avoid being denied a license to speak[, and the difficulty of
effectively detecting, reviewing, and correcting content-based censorship."95 The first reason, self-censorship, has been properly criticized
as an insufficient basis for treating these prior restraints differently

88. Id. at 906.
89. Id. at 907. Justice Kennedy did not join with Justices Marshall and O'Connor in
opposing Judge Hoeveler's order requiring CNN to produce the Noriega tapes. 498 U.S.
at 976. One likely distinguishing feature was that, unlike the movie, the Noriega tapes

were not the product of CNN's editorial labor. Rather, they were merely copies of tapes
recorded by prison officials at the MCC. Arguably, producing someone else's work product
does not create the same sort of intimidation as a review of one's own editorial creation.
90. Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
91. See, e.g., Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969); Niemotko v.

Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951).
92. See, e.g., Secretary of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947 (1984);
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
93. City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750 (1988).
94. Niemotko, 340 U.S. at 271.
95. Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 759.
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than subsequent punishment. Obviously, a realistic threat of criminal
sanction will also tend to cause self-censorship.9 6
The far more relevant concern with this sort of prior restraint is that
courts will be unable to review the action of a decision-maker who is not
bound by definite standards, if only favored speakers are selected:
Standards provide the guideposts that check the licensor and allow
courts quickly and easily to determine whether the licensor is discriminating against disfavored speech. Without these guideposts, post hoc
rationalizations by the licensing official and the use of shifting or
illegitimate criteria are far too easy, making it difficult for courts to
determine in any particular case whether the licensor is permitting
favorable, and suppressing unfavorable, expression.97
Unlimited discretion, thus, creates a prior restraint. The administrator of the system is given the ability to select who will be permitted to
speak, and the courts are unable to prevent the silencing of disfavored
speakers. By contrast, a registration or licensing system that does not
vest discretion in the administrator is generally not considered to be a
prior restraint. Abuse of such processes can be readily detected by any
reviewing court. Accordingly, systems such as those providing for firstcome, first-served registration for using a public park do not pose a First
Amendment problem.9"
C. ProceduralSafeguards for Executive Decision-Making
The Supreme Court has also required extensive procedural safeguards
for those instances when executive branch licensing or censorship is
permitted. Beginning in 1965, the Court has announced a rigid set of
guidelines to ensure adequate judicial review of executive restraints on
speech.
The need for procedural protection is based on a fundamental distrust
of the executive branch functionary who would make the initial decision:
"Because the censor's business is to censor, there inheres the danger that
he may well be less responsive than a court-part of an independent
branch of government-to the constitutionally-protected interests in free
expression."99 The risks to First Amendment freedoms from improper

96. See, e.g., Blasi, supra, note 5, at 35.
97. 486 U.S. at 758.
98. See Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574-576 (1941).
99. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 57-58 (1965); see also Southeastern
Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546,560-61 (1975) (stating, "lain administrative board
assigned to screening stage productions-and keeping off stage anything not deemed
culturally uplifting or healthful-may well be less responsive than a court, an independent
branch of government, to constitutionally protected interests in free expression").
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decision-making are so great that any system in which the government
can restrict expression prior to its communication must be "operated
under judicial superintendence and assured an almost immediate
judicial determination of the validity of the restraint.""°
In the 1965 case of Freedman v. Maryland,10 ' the Court announced
the procedural safeguards it had "designed to obviate the dangers of a
censorship system." °2 In any system of prior restraint:
First,the burden of instituting judicial proceedings, and of proving that
the material is unprotected, must rest on the censor. Second, any
restraint prior to judicial review can be imposed only for a specified
brief period and only for the purpose of preserving the status quo.
Third, a prompt final judicial determination must be assured. 3
These procedures protect speech in a number of important ways. By
placing the burden of persuasion on the censor, the Court protects the
"transcendent value of speech," even at the cost of foregoing the
punishment of some unprotected speech.' 4 Next, by requiring the
government to seek judicial review and enforcing this requirement by
limiting the duration of any restraint to that necessary for review, the
Court prevents the censor's decision from being the final decision.1
These safeguards have been held applicable not only to censorship
boards, but also to systems of informal censorship. Thus, in Bantam
Books, Inc. v. Sullivan,' the Court struck down Rhode Island's use of
a "Commission to Encourage Morality in Youth," which advised book
distributors and police that it had determined specific books to be
obscene or otherwise "objectionable."1 7 The Court viewed this informal system as "a form of effective state regulation superimposed upon
the State's criminal regulation of obscenity and making such regulation
largely unnecessary."'
Despite the fact the commission lacked
enforcement power, the Court ruled that "informal censorship may

100. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963).
101. 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
102. Id. at 58.
103. Southeastern Promotions, 420 U.S. at 560 (summarizing Freedman, 380 U.S. at
58-59). The Southeastern Promotions description is far more succinct than that in
Freedman.
104. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958).
105. Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58.
106. 372 U.S. 58 (1963).
107. Id. at 59.
108. Id. at 69.
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sufficiently inhibit the circulation of publications" to require the
safeguards of judicial supervision with immediate judicial review. °9
The Supreme Court has also recognized procedural safeguards are
needed to police judicial, as well as administrative, restraints. Thus,
courts are prohibited from issuing ex parte injunctions against speech
unless "it is impossible to serve or to notify the opposing parties and to
give them an opportunity to participate."" ° Moreover, just as adverse
decisions of censors must be subject to prompt judicial review, adverse
decisions of courts must be subject to prompt appellate review. When
the town of Skokie, Illinois, tried to prevent a Nazi parade, the Supreme
Court noted an injunction that lasted throughout an extended appellate
process could last more than a year."' Thus, concluded the Court, "If
a State seeks to impose a restraint of this kind, it must provide
strict
"1 2
procedural safeguards, including immediate appellate review.
III.

EXCLUSIONS FROM AND EXCEPTIONS TO THE PRIOR RESTRAINT
DOCTRINE

Providing a definition of prior restraint is only half the job. It is also
necessary to describe, define, and delimit the exceptions to the prior
restraint doctrine. One of the greatest sources of confusion surrounding
the prior restraint doctrine has been the scope of the exceptions to the
doctrine. The usual starting point for analyzing the exceptions to the
prior restraint doctrine is the dicta from Near, in which the Court
announced the four "exceptional cases" when the absolute ban on prior
restraint is eased: troop movements, obscenity, incitement and other
words that have "all the effect of force," and the protection of private
rights according to equitable principles." 3 Unfortunately, this listing
has proven to be one of the major obstacles to a full understanding of the
prior restraint doctrine. It does not describe the rationale for inclusion
in, or exclusion from, the role of "exceptional" cases. Ironically, not only
does the casualness of the list invite overuse of prior restraint, several
important exceptions are omitted from the list as well.
If the prior restraint doctrine is to be an honest principle of adjudication, the exceptions must be justified based on the historical and
practical postulates of the doctrine itself. Moreover, there must be
consistency in determining which restraints are exceptions and which
are subject to the rigors of the doctrine.

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at 67.
Carroll v. President & Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 180 (1968).
National Socialist Party of America v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43, 44 (1977).
Id.
Near, 283 U.S. at 716.
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Further, it must be recognized that many restrictions on speech are
not prior restraints at all. Restraints that do not threaten the separation of powers, such as judicial orders governing trial participants or
executive branch contracts limiting speech by executive branch
employees, should not be regarded as prior restraints. Similarly, taxes
on speakers that do not require a particularized analysis of the content
of expression should not be treated as a prior restraint. Finally,
regulation of conduct or property rights should not be regarded as a
prior restraint, even when expression is combined with the conduct (as
in commercial speech) or the property right (as with copyrights).
All these forms of regulation, though, are still governed by the First
Amendment and may be struck down pursuant to other forms of
analysis. The First Amendment is broad enough to prevent encroachments on freedom of speech without categorizing all encroachments as
prior restraints. Most significantly, there is a real danger that if all
forms of regulation are linked with prior restraint, the result will be a
watered-down form of protection against true prior restraints. For
example, when the Court has tried to explain why an order limiting
commercial speech or prohibiting a demonstration near a hospital is a
permissible prior restraint, the rationale sets the stage for 1a4 wholesale
retreat from the purity of the true prior restraint doctrine.
Any deviation from the traditional ban on prior restraint, however, can
easily lead to the exceptions swallowing the rule. The exclusions from
the prior restraint doctrine and the exceptions from the rule, therefore,
must be "narrowly defined.""' Accordingly, courts must be vigilant to
maintain the safeguard that "[a]ny system of prior restraints of
expression comes6 ... bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.""
A.

Restraints on Expression That Do Not Create a PriorRestraint

1. Preserving Order in the Court. The issuance of judicial orders
to preserve order in the courtroom and ensure a fair trial presents a
particularly difficult challenge for any theory of prior restraint. An
inherent paradox lies in the fact that the injunction against expression

114. See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994); Pittsburgh Press
Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973).

115. Southeastern Promotions,420 U.S. at 559.
116. Bantam Books, 372 U.S. at 70.
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is both the traditional paradigm of the unconstitutional prior restraint
and the traditional means for judges to control their courtrooms. "7
Drawing the line between these two is a delicate task that will be
helped by two related observations. First, judicial orders issued to trial
participants and to those within the courtroom are so fundamentally
different from classic prior restraints that they should not be considered
prior restraints. Second, even though these orders should not be
considered prior restraints, they are still subject to the stringent
commands of the First Amendment.
The primary distinction between judicial orders restricting trial
participants and restrictions against the media and other traditional
prior restraints is that the former do not threaten the separation of
powers."' It is within the "inherent equitable powers of courts of law
over their own process, to prevent abuses, oppression, and injustices."' Judges have a unique interest in the effect that the conduct of
the parties to a case before them will have on the trial of that case, and
a judge's orders in that regard do not encroach on the responsibility
reserved for the legislative or executive branch. 2 °
Moreover, the judicial power to control the speech of the participants
in a case about that particular case is a far more circumscribed power
than that possessed by those wielding traditional prior restraints. 2 '
The judicial order in these narrow instances "does not raise the same
specter of government censorship that such control might suggest in
other situations." 22 Especially when the media is free to comment on
the court, the ability of a judge to control out-of-court discussion is
extremely limited.

117. See Near, 283 U.S. at 715 ("There is... the conceded authority of courts to punish
for contempt when publications directly tend to prevent the proper discharge of judicial

functions.").

118. See supra Part II. The distinction is far less problematic than the implication that
the media has speech rights greater than the average citizen. See, e.g., C. EDWIN BAKER,
HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 241 (1989) (stating that "[clertainly, there is no
reason to give the press special rights to be free of gag orders or prior restraints on its
speech").
119. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 35 (1984) (quoting International
Prods. Corp. v. Koons, 325 F.2d 403, 407-08 (2d Cir. 1963)) (emphasis added).
120. One court referred to these orders as "actions taken by the court in its legislative
role [rather than] those taken in its adjudicative role." Chicago Council of Lawyers v.
Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 248 (7th Cir. 1975).
121. In the words of Blackstone, "To subject the press to the restrictive power of the
censor, as was formerly done.., is to subject all freedom of sentiment to the prejudices of
one man, and make him the arbitrary and infallible judge of all controverted points in
learning, religion, and government." BLACKSTONE, supra note 30, at 153.
122. Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 32.
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Historically, courts have always had the power to punish for contempt,
a power that is not inconsistent with our historic antipathy to prior
restraint." As the Supreme Court stated in 1812:
[c]ertain implied powers must necessarily result to our Courts ofjustice
. . .
To fine for contempt-imprison for contumacy-inforce [sic] the observance of order,
[etc.] are powers which cannot be dispensed with in a Court, because
they are necessary to the exercise of all others.'24
from the nature of their institution .

Accordingly, court orders restraining speech inside the courtroom are not
only permissible, they are the norm: "Courts independently must be
vested with 'power to impose silence, respect, and decorum, in their
presence ..

,.125

But the power to punish for contempt has long been recognized as one
particularly subject to abuse: "That contempt power... is capable of
abuse is certain. Men who make their way to the bench sometimes
exhibit vanity, irascibility, narrowness,
arrogance, and other weaknesses
126
to which human flesh is heir."
Distrust of the judiciary led Congress, early in the nineteenth century,
to delimit the power of federal judges to hold out-of-court speakers in

123.
The power to punish for contempts is inherent in all courts; its existence is
essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the
enforcement of the judgments, orders, and writs of the courts, and consequently
to the due administration of justice. The moment the courts of the United States
were called into existence and invested with jurisdiction over any subject, they
became possessed of this power.
Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 510 (1873).
124. United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812); see also International
Union, United Mine Workers of America v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 832 (1994) ("The
necessity justification for the contempt authority is at its pinnacle, of course, where
contumacious conduct threatens a court's immediate ability to conduct its proceedings, such
as where a witness refuses to testify, or a party disrupts the court .... In light of the
court's substantial interest in rapidly coercing compliance and restoring order, and because
the contempt's occurrence before the court reduces the need for extensive factfinding and
the likelihood of an erroneous deprivation, summary proceedings have been tolerated.").
125. InternationalUnion, United Mine Workers, 512 U.S. at 831 (quoting Anderson v.
Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 227 (1821)); see also Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89,
104 n.21 (1981) ("In the conduct of a case, a court often finds it necessary to restrict the
free expression of participants, including counsel, witnesses, and jurors.").
126. Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 12 (1952); see also Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S.
194, 201 (1968) (stating that contemptuous conduct, though a public wrong, often strikes
at the most vulnerable and human qualities of a judge's temperament; even when the
contempt is not a direct insult to the court or the judge, it frequently represents a rejection
of judicial authority, or an interference with the judicial process or with the duties of
officers of the court).
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contempt. In 1826 Judge James H. Peck summarily imprisoned and
disbarred Luke Lawless for contempt after Lawless published an

unflattering criticism of one of Peck's opinions.

In 1831 the United

States Senate came within one vote of impeaching Judge Peck for
abusing judicial power.'2 7 The day after the impeachment vote, the
Senate began considering legislation to ensure, in the words of James
Buchanan, that Judge Peck was the "last man in the United States to
exercise this power, and Mr. Lawless has been its last victim." 28
The new law prevented federal judges from using summary contempt
powers against out-of-court statements, limiting such power to behavior
"in the presence of the said courts, or so near thereto as to obstruct the
administration of justice." 129 The Supreme Court has stated that
"viewed in its historical context," this law demonstrates "a respect for
the prohibitions of the First Amendment, not as mere guides to the
formulation of policy, but as commands the breach of which cannot be
tolerated."3 0
Judges, therefore, are essentially barred from using their traditional
contempt power to punish out-of-court statements in the interest of
protecting "the administration of justice." 3' Nebraska Press confirmed
and expanded the basic principle that judges may not enjoin the out-of-

127. The vote in favor of Judge Peck was probably based, in part, on "humane considerations, accentuated by the Judge's age and blindness." Felix Frankfurter & James Landis,
Power of CongressOver Procedurein Criminal Contempts in "Inferior"Federal Courts-A
Study in Separation of Powers, 37 HARV. L. REV. 1010, 1024 (1924).
128. ARTHUR STANSBURY, REPORT OF THE TRIAL OF JAMES H. PECK 464 (1833). James
Buchanan had been in charge of the prosecution of Judge Peck in the Senate. Nye v.
United States, 313 U.S. 33, 45 (1941).
129. Act of Mar. 2, 1831, ch. 98; 4 Stat 487 (1831). The same language can be found
today at 28 U.S.C. § 385 (1995). As if to show the difficulty in constraining judicial power,
the Court in Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 402, 419 (1918), interpreted
this language so broadly as to permit out-of-court conduct to be punished summarily if it
had a "tendency to prevent and obstruct the discharge of judicial duty." Finally, in Nye,
313 U.S. at 52, the Court restored the statute to its intended meaning, ruling that the
conduct subject to summary contempt proceeding was limited to "misbehavior in the
vicinity of the court disrupting to quiet and order or actually interrupting the court in the
conduct of its business."
130. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 267 (1941). In Bridges the Court confirmed
it was unconstitutional for a judge to hold an out-of-court speaker in contempt for

"disrespect" and could use contempt power only to prevent a "clear and present danger" the
publication would cause the "disorderly and unfair administration of justice." Id. at 263,
270.
131. The First Amendment restricts the contempt powers for state judges in essentially
the same manner as the federal statute restricts federal judges. Compare Bridges, 314
U.S. at 267 with Nye, 313 U.S. at 47-48.
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court statements of nonparticipants and that such injunctions will be
struck down as improper prior restraints.
In Nebraska Press, the Court implied that an acceptable alternative
to prior restraint might be to "limit what the contending lawyers, the
police, and witnesses may say to anyone."13 2 In recognizing that such
limits might face constitutional scrutiny as well, the Court correctly did
not refer to them as prior restraints but recognized that such limits on
speech were still
"subject to challenge as interfering with press rights to
133
news sources."
In fact, the use of the prior restraint doctrine to analyze restrictions
on the speech of trial participants is problematic. Even though these
restrictions constitute a "predetermined judicial prohibition restraining
specific expression," 13 attempts to treat them as prior restraints have
proven to be confusing and unnecessary and seriously threaten to dilute
the protections afforded by the doctrine.
The confusion has been noted by one court that complained that more
than twenty years after Nebraska Press, "[n]o certain consensus exists
as to whether an order that regulates the trial participants' extrajudicial
statements is a prior restraint. " 13 5 Indeed, numerous cases can be
found on both sides of the question of whether to term these orders prior
restraints.3 6 Some courts have even treated the exact same order as
a prior restraint if challenged by the gagged party, but not if challenged
by the media.' 7 Two Supreme Court cases involving restrictions on
the speech of trial participants-one a court order, the other a subsequent punishment-reveal the prior restraint appellation favored by
many lower courts is mere surplusage.
In Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada,3 ' the Supreme Court upheld a
Nevada Supreme Court rule prohibiting lawyers from issuing out-ofcourt statements about pending cases "if the lawyer knows or reasonably

132. Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 564.
133. Id. at 564 n.8.
134. Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 248 (7th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied sub nom. Cunningham v. Chicago Council of Lawyers, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
135. United States v. Davis, 902 F. Supp. 98, 102 (E.D. La. 1995).
136. For cases finding such an order to be a prior restraint, see Twohig v. Blackmer,
918 P.2d 332, 336 (N.M. 1996); United States v. Salameh, 992 F.2d 445, 446-47 (2d Cir.
1993); Breiner v. Takao, 835 P.2d 637, 640-41 (Haw. 1992); Davenport v. Garcia, 834
S.W.2d 4, 9-11 (Tex. 1992); Kemner v. Monsanto Co., 492 N.E.2d 1327, 1336 (Ill. 1986);
Chase v. Robson, 435 F.2d 1059, 1061 (7th Cir. 1970). For cases finding these orders are
not prior restraints, see Radio & Television News Ass'n v. United States Dist. Court, 781

F.2d 1443, 1446 (9th Cir. 1986); Bauer, 522 F.2d at 248.
137. See, e.g., In re Application of Dow Jones & Co., 842 F.2d 603, 609 (2d Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 946 (1988); but see, CBS v. Young, 522 F.2d 234, 239 (6th Cir. 1975).
138. 501 U.S. 1030 (1991).
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should know that it will have a substantial likelihood of materially
Although the lawyer
prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding."" 9
challenging the rule argued the antiprior restraint presumption of
Nebraska Press should apply, the Court never even mentioned the
phrase "prior restraint."14 Instead, the Court said that as "officers of
the court," lawyers' speech was protected by "a less demanding
standard." 4 The Nevada court's rule met that standard because it
was "narrowly tailored" to protect the "fundamental right to a fair trial
by 'impartial' jurors."'
By contrast, the Court in Butterworth v. Smith 143 struck down a
Florida statute that "prohibit[ed] grand jury witness[es] from ever
disclosing testimony which [they] gave before that body.""4 The Court
warned that under the Florida law, government critics could be easily
silenced by simply calling them to testify before a grand jury because
they would then be prevented from repeating their criticism outside the
grand jury room.'4 5 Thus, the Court ruled it was necessary to balance
the witness's "First Amendment rights against Florida's interests in
preserving the confidentiality of its grand jury proceedings. " 146 This
balance strongly favors freedom of speech: "[Wihere a person 'lawfully
obtains truthful information about a matter of public significance ...
state officials may not constitutionally punish publication of the
information, absent a need to further a state interest of the highest
order.'" 147 Because Florida could offer no such interest after the grand
had concluded its business, the statute was declared unconstitutionjury
al. 148

139. Id. at 1060.
140. Id. at 1065.
141. Id. at 1074. Justice Brennan, in his concurring opinion in Nebraska Press,though
calling for a total ban on prior restraints of the speech of nontrial participants, also stated
that "[als officers of the court, court personnel and attorneys have a fiduciary responsibility
not to engage in public debate that will redound to the detriment of the accused or that will
obstruct the fair administration ofjustice." NebraskaPress, 427 U.S. at 601 n.27 (Brennan,
J., concurring).
142. 501 U.S. at 1075-76.
143. 494 U.S. 624 (1990).
144. Id. at 626.

145. Id. at 635-36. The Court noted that "[tihe potential for abuse of the Florida
prohibition, through its employment as a device to silence those who know of unlawful
conduct or irregularities on the part of public officials, is apparent." Id.

146. Id. at 630.
147. Id. at 632 (quoting Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979); Florida
Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 533 (1989)).

148. In his concurrence, Justice Scalia stated there was "considerable doubt" whether
a witness could be silenced even while the grand jury was sitting. Id. at 636 (Scalia, J.,
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Note that the court order silencing speech was upheld in Gentile, and
the statute imposing a subsequent penalty was struck down in Butterworth. Had the source of the rules been reversed, so that a statute
barred lawyer statements causing "a substantial likelihood of impairing
a fair trial" and a court order barred post-grand jury disclosures by
witnesses, not only would the results have been the same, but the
reasoning would have been unchanged as well.
The reasoning of both cases differs radically from the analysis of a
classic prior restraint. Totally absent is the abhorrence of prior
restraints as "the most serious and the least tolerable infringement on
First Amendment rights."149 Instead, the cases dealing with restrictions on the speech of trial participants involve a weighing of the free
speech interests of the speaker with the governmental interest in a
properly run judicial system. The speech interest varies with the role
of the speaker-a lawyer willingly assumes certain responsibilities to the
court that a mere witness does not. Moreover, for these restrictions to
be constitutional, the degree of threat to the judicial system need not be
as inevitable as the threat to the military of disclosing troop sailing
dates nor need the potential harm be as disastrous.
And this is when the attempts to use the prior restraint doctrine to
analyze judicial orders relating to trial participants pose their most
serious threat to the First Amendment. Once it is conceded that courts
have the ability, if not the duty, to protect the fairness of ongoing trials
from the potential danger caused by statements and actions of trial
participants, it is no longer possible to demand that the orders be issued
only if the threatened harm is an absolute certainty.
None of the gag orders on trial participants that have been upheld
would have survived the scrutiny demanded by Nebraska Press for
orders silencing nonparticipants."' If those orders are really prior
restraints, then the supposedly insurmountable barrier against prior

concurring).
149. Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 559.
150. See, e.g., Levine v. United States Dist. Court for the Central Dist. of Calif., 764
F.2d 590, 598 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1158 (1986) (finding out-of-court
comments pose a "serious and imminent threat to the administration of justice," when
defense attorneys had chosen directly to attack the prosecution's case in the media "during
and immediately before trial"); United States v. Tijerina, 412 F.2d 661,666 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 990 (1969) (stating that the judicial order was appropriate because
defendants' statements attacking the Government and the trial "made ... while [the]
criminal trial was pending [were] not compatible with the concept of a fair trial"); In re
Russell, 726 F.2d 1007, 1010 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 837 (1984) (upholding gag
order imposed on witnesses because of "tremendous publicity . .. [and] the potentially
inflammatory and highly prejudicial statements").
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restraint is capable of being scaled rather easily. If the doctrine of prior
restraint is to retain its vigor, judicial orders affecting only trial
participants should be treated as restrictions that are distinct from prior
restraint in history, purpose, and constitutional doctrine.
Nonetheless, restrictions on speech are always causes of concern. The
Court opined that "[t]o conclude that this is not a case of prior restraint
of the press is not to say that the restraining order need not be
justified."' 5 ' The question that finally must be resolved is what level
of justification is needed for the different judicial orders. The Supreme
Court upheld a ban on disclosing discovery information based on the
moderate standard of "'further[ing] a substantial governmental interest
unrelated to the suppression of expression,"' and limiting "'First
Amendment freedoms no greater than is necessary."" 52 In striking
down the statute limiting speech by grand jury witnesses, however, the
Court used a stricter standard demanding that the State prove "'a need
to further a state interest of the highest order."""
The choice of an appropriate standard is important for balancing
freedom of expression and the operation of our legal system. The
resolution will be easier, though, if the judicial orders on trial participants are not considered prior restraints.
2. Contracting for Prior Restraints. A requirement that an
author permit a government official to review a book prior to publication
and delete portions deemed dangerous to the government sounds like an
outrageous prior restraint worthy of the Star Chamber. In the
government employment context, though, the validity of such a
requirement must be evaluated without a simplistic reliance on the prior
restraint doctrine.
Many governmental employers, from the Central Intelligence Agency
to New York City's Administration for Children's Services, require their
employees to get some form of permission before communicating with the

151. In re Application of Dow Jones & Co., 842 F.2d 603, 609 (2nd Cir. 1988), cert.
denied sub. nom. Dow Jones & Co. v. Simon, 488 U.S. 946 (1988).
152. Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 32 (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413
(1974)).
153. Butterworth, 494 U.S. at 632 (quoting Smith v. Daily Mail, 443 U.S. 97, 103

(1979); Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 533 (1989)). Lower courts have utilized
different standards, requiring either a "reasonable likelihood" or "a clear and present
danger" of harm. Compare In re Application of Dow Jones & Co., 842 F.2d at 609
(requiring "reasonable likelihood"), with CBS v. Young, 522 F.2d at 238 (requiring "a clear
and present danger").
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Some courts have evaluated the constitutionality of such
public.'
requirements against the "general presumption against prior restraints
on speech." 5' Other courts have argued that the unique features of
employment context "dominate the special concerns about prior
restraints."156
There are indeed valid concerns, similar to those raised by traditional
prior restraints, whenever the government employer demands the right
to review and restrict employee speech. Justice Stevens warned of "the
risk that the reviewing agency will misuse its authority to delay the
publication of a critical work or to persuade an author to modify the
contents of his work."" 7 While such concerns warrant serious First
Amendment scrutiny, "[there is certainly no logical reason to think that
the existence of some element of prior restraint should remove a
restriction on employee speech from the usual ... approach."58
This "approach" derives from the special relationship of government
employee to government employer, which is obviously different from that
of citizen to government. Government employees do not lose their right
to freedom of expression but are subject to restrictions on their speech
that would be unconstitutional were they applied to the general
population."' It seems incontrovertible that "[wihen someone who is
paid a salary so that she will contribute to an agency's effective
operation begins to do or say things that detract from the agency's
effective operation, the government employer must have some power to
restrain her."'

154. See, e.g., Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 510-11 (1980) (upholding
requirement that CIA employees obtain the Agency's prior approval before publishing
information about the CIA); Harman v. City of New York, 140 F.3d 111, 115 (2d Cir. 1998)
(striking down ban on employees of the Administration for Children's Services from
speaking with the media regarding any activities of the agency without first obtaining
permission from the agency's media relations department).
155. Harman, 140 F.3d at 119. See Fire Fighters Ass'n v. Barry, 742 F. Supp. 1182,
1194 (D.D.C. 1990) (stating that the vesting of discretion in an official "creates an
unconstitutional prior restraint"); Spain v. City of Mansfield, 915 F. Supp. 919, 923 (N.D.
Ohio 1996); see also Zook v. Brown, 865 F.2d 887, 890 (7th Cir. 1989) (upholding a
regulation despite it being "a prior restraint on the free speech of a public employee").
156. Weaver v. United States Info. Agency, 87 F.3d 1429, 1440 (D.C. Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 520 U.S. 1251 (1997); see also Westbrook v. Teton County School Dist., 918 F. Supp.
1475, 1482 (D. Wyo. 1996) (stating that school policy prohibiting faculty criticism of the
administration "is not ... a constitutionally suspect 'prior restraint'").
157. Snepp, 444 U.S. at 526 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
158. Weaver, 87 F.3d at 1440.
159. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
160. Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 675 (1994) (plurality opinion).
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To apply the prior restraint doctrine to such a restriction would create
a watered-down version of the doctrine. Prior restraints can be imposed
only when the risk of catastrophic harm is a virtual certainty. In
contrast, courts have "consistently given greater deference to government
predictions of harm used to justify restriction of employee speech than
to predictions of harm used to justify restrictions on the speech of the
public at large."161
Moreover, treating employer rules as prior restraints would be
inappropriate. As with judicial orders limiting the speech of trial
participants, the restrictions on speech imposed by the executive branch
on its own employees do not present the separation of powers difficulties
of traditional prior restraints. Restrictions imposed in furtherance of the
interests of "an employer in regulating the speech of its employees"" 2
do not encroach on the law-making function of the legislative branch.
In addition, unlike traditional prior restraints, the limitations of
employee speech were voluntarily assumed in exchange for the benefits
of employment.'63 The restraint is not imposed by the might of the
sovereign but can be declined by those willing to forego the job opportunity.16
The First Amendment still plays a vital role in policing contractual
agreements imposing previous restriction on employee expression. In
Snepp v. United States,65 the Court upheld the constitutionality of a
contractual requirement that barred a former CIA employee from
publishing any book on the CIA without receiving "specific prior
approval by the Agency."' 66 Significantly, the Court did not say that
the CIA had final discretion over what was published. Instead, if the

161. Id. at 673.
162. 391 U.S. at 568.
163. See, e.g., Snepp, 444 U.S. at 509 n.3 (stating that "[wihen Snepp accepted
employment with the CIA, he voluntarily signed the agreement that expressly obligated
him to submit any proposed publication for prior review"). The Court in Snepp said the
agreement was entered into voluntarily and there was no claim Snepp "executed this
agreement under duress." Id.
164. There is also a strong argument that it is beneficial for government employees to
know the precise rules before speaking, rather than risk "the ad hoc, on-the-job reactions
that have been standard fare in many of our employment cases." United States v. National
Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 481 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Justice O'Connor notes there are benefits to both employer and
employee in "ex ante rules, in contrast to ex post punishments." Id. at 480. These benefits
are lost if the term "prior restraint" is automatically applied to all ex ante rules by a
government employer.
165. Snepp, 444 U.S. 507.

166. Id. at 508, 516. The Court also upheld an injunction "against future violations of
Snepp's prepublication obligation." Id. at 509.
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CIA had believed particular information to be harmful and the employee
did not agree, "the Agency would have borne the burden of seeking an
injunction against publication."1 7 Also, the Government must show
that the speech interests both of employees and their potential audiences
are "outweighed by that expression's 'necessary impact on the actual
operation' of the Government.""
The courts must not permit the government employer to use contractual provisions to censor critics. 169 But the prior restraint doctrine is
neither the necessary nor the appropriate mechanism for protecting the
free speech rights of government employees.
3. Taxing the Press. The Court has intermittently equated
taxation of the press with prior restraint. This not only clouds the real
definition of prior restraint, but it is unnecessary because differential
taxation of the press can be found unconstitutional without any
reference to the prior restraint doctrine.
In Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization of California,170 the Court upheld the application of a generally applicable sales
tax to the distribution of religious materials by a religious organization.171 The Court distinguished this general tax from taxes that had
been struck down in earlier cases: a flat licensing fee, challenged by
Jehovah's Witnesses, imposed on those distributing religious literature,172 and a requirement, challenged by an evangelist, that required
17
all booksellers to pay a flat fee to obtain a license to sell books. 1
According to the Court in Jimmy Swaggart Ministries, those earlier
cases prohibit taxation only when "a flat license tax operates as a prior

167. Id. at 513 n.8 (citing Alfred A. Knoff, Inc. v. Colby, 509 F.2d 1362, 1369 (4th Cir.
1975); United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir. 1992)).
168. NationalTreasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. at 468 (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S.
at 571). In National Treasury Employees Union, the Court struck down a ban on federal
employees receiving honoraria for appearances, speeches, or articles. Id. at 457. This
balancing test applies only when the employee speaks "as a citizen upon matters of public
concern" rather than "as an employee upon matters only of personal interest." Connick v.
Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983).
169. For an excellent discussion of this concern, see Alan Garfield, Promises of Silence:
Contract Law and Freedom of Speech, 83 CoRN. L. REV. 261 (1998). Professor Garfield
proposes that courts not enforce contractual restraints on employee speech "when the
public interest in access to the suppressed information outweighs any legitimate interest
in contract enforcement." Id. at 266.
170. 493 U.S. 378 (1990).
171. Id. at 378.
172. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 106 (1943).
173. Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573, 574 (1944).
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restraint on the free exercise of religious beliefs."1 4 What made these
taxes operate as a prior restraint, according to the Court, was that the
taxes, which were "unrelated to the receipts or income of the speaker or
to the expenses of administering a valid regulatory scheme [were
imposed] as a condition of the right to speak."'75
What is wrong with this analysis is that a tax imposed by a legislature
is not a prior restraint merely because it operates as a condition of the
exercise of free communication. All taxes, permissible and impermissible
alike, function as conditions on speech.
Moreover, unlike prior
restraints, the forbidden taxes do not permit particularized analysis of
the content of the speakers, and no government official is "authorized to
take notice of writings intended for the press." 7 ' These taxes do not
put either the executive or judiciary in the position of censor. But,
despite the fact that they should not be labeled a prior restraint, these
taxes were indeed unconstitutional.
The better approach would be to say, directly, that while general
taxation that includes the press along with others is perfectly constitutional, a tax aimed at either the press in general or focused on a
segment of the press in particular is per se unconstitutional. Such
differential taxation, reminiscent of the English
"taxes on knowledge,"
17
has no place under our First Amendment.
After press licensing ended in England at the end of the seventeenth
century, the Crown searched for a new device for control of its critics.
Fearing most the ability of inexpensive publications to reach a wide
number of the less affluent in the general population, Parliament
imposed in 1712 a tax on all newspapers and advertisements. It was
widely understood "the main purpose of these taxes was to suppress the
publication of comments and criticisms objectionable to the Crown." 7 '
The 1765 imposition on the American colonies of a similar tax, the
Stamp Act, has been termed the moment when "the revolution really
began." 7 ' These taxes were not considered to be a prior restraint but

174. 493 U.S. at 389.
175. Id. at 388 (quoting Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of
Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 587 n.9 (1983)).
176. 3 STORY, supra note 35 § 1879.
177. See generally 1 COLLETT DOBSON, HISTORY OF THE TAXES ON KNOWLEDGE 4-6, T.F.

Unwin (1889). As the Supreme Court has stated, the phrase "taxes on knowledge" was
used "for the purpose of describing the effect of the exactions and at the same time
condemning them." Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 246 (1936).
178. 297 U.S. at 246.
179. Id. (citing William Stewart, Lennox and the Taxes on Knowledge, 15 SCOTT1SH
HISTORICAL REV. 322, 327 (1918)).
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were condemned as "a new restraint," 8 ° adopted "avowedly for the
purpose of restraining the Press generally and of crushing the smaller
papers."' 8 '
In Grosjean v.American Press Co.,12 the Court used similar reasoning to strike down Louisiana's tax on the gross receipts from the sale of
advertising on all newspapers with a weekly circulation above twenty
thousand." Although alluding to the prior restraint doctrine,'8 the
Court stressed the independent history of antipathy to "taxes on
knowledge." The Court declared that the tax was "bad because, in the
light of its history and of its present setting, it is seen to be a deliberate
and calculated device in the guise of a tax to limit the circulation of
information."' s
Thus, the issue of taxation of the press should be removed from
analysis under the prior restraint doctrine. Instead, a more straightforward approach should be utilized. General taxation is permissible but
specialized taxation against the press or a particular speaker is properly
condemned as an unconstitutional "tax on knowledge." Not every
violation of a free press is a prior restraint.
4. Speech as Property or Conduct. How can a system of justice
that cherishes free speech and abhors prior restraints permit injunctions
to be issued against a book publisher just because a book uses copyrighted material without permission? How can a speaker be enjoined from

180.

2 THOMAS E. MAY, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 108 (7th ed. 1864)

(reprinted Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1986).
181. THOMAS PITt TASWELL-LANGMEAD, ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 597 (6th
ed. 1905).

182. 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
183. Id. at 250-51. The case was described more fully in Minneapolis Star & Tribune
Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983), in which the Court stated the
tax was imposed to limit the ability of the critics of Governor Huey Long to communicate
with their readers. Id. at 579-80. The Court quoted Huey Long as terming this tax "atax
on lying, 2c [sic] a lie." Id. at 580.
184. 297 U.S. at 246. After describing examples of taxation against the press, the
Court stated the First Amendment was meant to preclude the government "from adopting
any form of previous restraint upon printed publications, or their circulation, including that
which had theretofore been effected by these two well-known and odious methods." Id. at
249.
185. Id. at 250. A major danger with a tax on knowledge is the ability to alter the tax
gives the government a perpetual threat over its potential critics. Accordingly, the Court
in Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. struck down a tax on the components used in printing
newspapers: "Differential taxation of the press, then, places such a burden on the interests
protected by the First Amendment that we cannot countenance such treatment unless the
State asserts a counterbalancing interest of compelling importance that it cannot achieve
without differential taxation." 460 U.S. at 585 (footnote omitted).
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communicating particular words just because the words convey an
extortionate threat?
The answers to such questions lie in the fact that speech can have
multiple aspects beyond the mere expression of an idea. Speech can
sometimes function as "verbal property" or "verbal acts.""'6 These are
not self-defining terms, and extraordinary care must be taken to prevent
such terms from "cannibalizing speech values at the margin."" 7
i. Verbal Property. It is not a prior restraint for a court to enjoin the
wrongful taking of verbal property. The injunction in this case is not
silencing expression to prevent the harm it might do to other interests
but is preventing the wrongful taking of the value the expression itself
possesses."
The most common form of verbal property is the copyright. Congress
was given the power in the original Constitution to create "a marketable
right to the use of one's expression."189 Unlike defamation, copyright
violations have long been prevented by injunction. In 1741 the court
enjoined the unauthorized publication of letters written by the poet
Alexander Pope on the theory that Pope possessed a continuing right in
the property that the court may protect.'9g Similarly, in 1842 a New

186. The phrase "verbal acts" was used by the Supreme Court in Gompers v. Buck's
Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 439 (1911). 1 use the phrase advisedly, as it has gone
out of favor, largely, one suspects, because its use was often a rationale for the oppression
of free communication. Properly defined though, the phrase "verbal acts" captures the
essence of a speech/conduct dichotomy that removes certain regulation from the prior
restraint doctrine. The phrase "verbal property" was chosen because of its parallel
structure with verbal acts. See also Diane Zimmerman, Information as Speech, Information
as Goods, 33 WM & MARY L. REV. 665 (1992). Professor Zimmerman's extraordinary article
examines the difference between regulating information as a "public commodity" and as "a
form of private wealth." Id. at 665.
187. Zimmerman, supra note 186, at 667 (footnote ommitted).
188. Other aspects of the First Amendment, though, may well affect the determination
of whether an injunction is an appropriate remedy. See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers,
Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 559 (1985) ("We do not suggest this right not to speak
would sanction abuse of the copyright owner's monopoly as an instrument to suppress
facts.").
189. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 558 (stating that "it should not be forgotten that the
Framers intended copyright itself to be the engine of free expression"). Article I, § 8, of
the Constitution provides: "The Congress shall have Power ... to Promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."
190. Pope v. Curl, 2 Eng. Rep. 342 (Ch. 1741). Similarly, a New York court in 1839,
while finding that injunctions against libels were "infringing upon liberty of the press,"
held that equity courts could issue injunctions to protect "rights of literary property."
Brandbreth v. Lance, 8 Paige's Chancery 24, 26-28 (N.Y. 1839).
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York court upheld an injunction against the publication of private letters
without the author's consent.19 ' The court stressed the injunction was
not based on a claim of privacy or defamation but instead "on no other
principle and upon no broader ground than that of a [copyright] in
literary productions."'9 2 The court permitted the injunction, stating
that liberty of speech only encompasses the right "which every citizen
has, to speak, write and publish his own sentiments, either originating
with himself or such as he chosen [sic] to make his own by adoption with
the consent of the author expressly or impliedly given, being responsible
for the abuse of that right."'93
The speaker who is the focus of the court's solicitude is the copyright
holder and not the infringer. 194 Infringers want to speak the copyright
holder's words; copyright holders want to retain control over their own
speech. Injunctions against infringement merely reflect a constitutional
preference for the person who created the speech in the first place.' 95
Thus, author J.D. Salinger was able to enjoin a biographer from
publishing excerpts of his unpublished letters. 9 ' The First Amendment "cost" of such a ruling is considered small, both because the
original speaker still has the right to speak and the "infringer" is limited
only as to "the form of expression and not the ideas expressed." 9 7

191. Wetmore v. Sovell, N.Y. Ch. 515 (1842).
192. Id. at 556.
193. Id. at 562.
194. See, e.g., Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 559 (upholding copyright damages for
unauthorized publication of excerpts of former-President Ford's memoirs).
195. See, e.g., Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 244 N.E.2d 250 (N.Y.
1968). The court stated,
The essential thrust of the First Amendment is to prohibit improper restraints on
the voluntary public expression of ideas; it shields the man who wants to speak
or publish when others wish him to be quiet. There is necessarily, and within
suitably defined areas, a concomitant freedom not to speak publicly, one which
serves the same ultimate end as freedom of speech in its affirmative aspect.
Id. at 255 (emphasis in original).
196. Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 100 (2d Cir. 1987).
197. New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 727 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice White's
attempt to distinguish copyright injunctions from the prior restraint sought against the
Pentagon Papers was less successful: "[Wihen the press is enjoined under the copyright
laws the complainant is a private copyright holder enforcing a private right." Id. at 731
n.1 (White, J., concurring). An injunction designed to protect a "private right" can still be
an impermissible prior restraint. See, e.g., CBS, Inc. v. Davis, 510 U.S. 1315, 1318 (1994)
(striking down injunction against broadcast of a videotape of meat packing operations,
which had been sought to prevent harms caused by trespass, breach of the duty of loyalty,
and disclosure of trade secrets). And, of course, defamation, which seeks to protect the
private right of reputation, is not enforced by injunction. See, e.g., Kidd v. Horry, 28 F.
773, 776 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1886).
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Courts will also enjoin infringements of a "right to publicity."19

This right may be thought of as a celebrity's right to the exclusive
commercial use of his or her name and likeness.'9 9

The Supreme

Court has stated that protection provided by the right to publicity is

"closely analogous" to the protection of copyright law because both focus

on "protecting the proprietary interest of the individual" and the "right
of the individual to reap the reward of his endeavors."2 ° °

Another form of "proprietary speech" that courts will enjoin is the
disclosure of trade secrets and other confidential business information
by employees. As the Supreme Court has noted, "confidential information acquired or compiled by a corporation in the course and conduct of
its business is a species of property to which the corporation has the

exclusive right and benefit, and which a court of equity will protect
through the injunctive process or other appropriate remedy."2"'
Copyright, the right of publicity, trade secrets, and confidential
business information can all be considered to be verbal property. While

there may well be other First Amendment questions surrounding their
regulation, the prior restraint doctrine is not relevant. Courts are
permitted to use their power of injunction to prevent the wrongful taking
of the value the expression itself possesses.
It is critically important that injunctions be issued only to stop the

wrongful taking of verbal property.

In copyright, for example, a

wrongful taking is nonpermissive and not fair use. A parody, therefore,
cannot be successfully enjoined. 0 2

198. See, e.g., The Martin Luther King, Jr., Ctr. for Soc. Change, Inc. v. American
Heritage Prods., Inc., 250 Ga. 135, 296 S.E.2d 697 (1982) (enjoining sale of busts of Rev.
Martin Luther King, Jr.); Bi-Rite Enters., Inc. v. Bruce Miner Co., 757 F.2d 440, 441 (1st
Cir. 1985) (enjoining distribution of posters depicting rock stars).
199. See, e.g., Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836, 843 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
200. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977) (upholding
damages for television broadcast of the "entire act" of the "human cannonball"). The Court
distinguished copyright and publicity damages, which were "proprietary," from defamation
and false light privacy, which were "protecting feelings or reputation." Id.; see also William
L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 406 (1960) (stating that the interest protected
in the right of publicity cases "is not so much a mental as a proprietary one"). Moreover,
in defamation and false light cases, "the only way to protect the interests involved is to
attempt to minimize publication of the damaging matter" while in copyright and 'right of
publicity' cases, "the only question is who gets to do the publishing." Zacchini, 433 U.S.
at 573.
201. Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 26 (1987) (quoting 3 W. FLETCHER,
CYCLOPEDIA OF LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 857.1, at 260 (rev. ed. 1986)); see also
Cherne Indus., Inc. v. Grounds & Assocs., Inc., 278 N.W.2d 81, 94 n.9 (Minn. 1979) (stating
that enjoining publication of trade secrets in violation of a contractual duty is not a prior
restraint).
202. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 583 (1994).
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Similarly, the disclosure of confidential business information is only
wrongful if done by someone who has acquired the information "by
virtue of a confidential or fiduciary relationship."2"3 Thus, Business
Week could not be enjoined from publishing confidential business
information about a trial litigant that a court had placed under seal.2"4
ii. Verbal Acts. Identifying verbal acts that can be enjoined is far
more difficult than identifying verbal property because "[e]xpression and
conduct ... are inextricably tied together in all communicative
behavior."2" 5 Because so much, if not all, expression involves "speech
plus,"2 °8 a simple rule permitting restraints of the "plus" would
eviscerate much of the First Amendment's protection. Nonetheless,
restrictions that would be unconstitutional prior restraints are permissible in those instances when "speech is brigaded with action."2 7
For example, just as violence against property can be enjoined, so can
threats to bring about violence.20 8 It has sometimes been difficult for
courts to identify the line between protected advocacy and an enjoinable

"standing menace." 20 9 Applying this principle to physical demonstrations such as picketing, though, is especially difficult. Picketing is
conduct that is an essential part of the exercise of First Amendment

203.
204.

Diamond v. Oreamuno, 248 N.E.2d 910, 912 (N.Y. 1969).
Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 78 F.3d 219, 232 (6th Cir. 1996).

205.

LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 827 (2d ed. 1988) (emphasis

added).
206. See, e.g., International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 695 v. Vogt, 354 U.S. 284,
289 (1957); Bakery & Pastry Drivers & Helpers Local 802 of the Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters
v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 775 (1942) (Douglas, J., concurring).
207. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 456 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring); see also
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 563 (1965) (stating "certain forms of conduct mixed with
speech may be regulated or prohibited"); Giboney v.Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S.
490, 502 (1949) (banning "placards used as an essential and inseparable part of a grave
offense against an important public law").
208. Citizens' Light, Heat & Power Co. v. Montgomery Light & Water Power Co., 171
F. 553, 557-58 (M.D. Ala. 1909) ("The First Amendment does not protect violence.");
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 916 (1982).
209. In Sherry v. Perkins, 17 N.E. 307 (Mass. 1888), the court enjoined the display of
a banner saying "Lasters are requested to keep away from P.P. Sherry's .... Per order

L.P.U." because "[tihe banner was a standing menace to all who were, or wished to be, in
the employment of the plaintiff, to deter them from entering the plaintiff's premises." Id.
at 310. Compare Beck v.Railway Teamsters'ProtectiveUnion, 77 N.W. 13, 22 (Mich. 1898)
(stating that circulars urging a labor boycott were a "standing menace") with Marx & Haas
Jeans Clothing Co. v. Watson, 67 S.W. 391, 392 (Mo. 1902) (denying injunction against call
for a labor boycott as a prior restraint).
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freedoms.21 ° Yet, it is conduct "subject to regulation even though
intertwined with expression and association."211 Fear of unrest or
violence will not justify an injunction on picketing. The Court has
permitted injunctions against peaceful picketing upon a record of
"pervasive" or "extensive violence" but not "from a trivial rough incident
or a moment of animal exuberance" or from "dissociated acts of past
violence."212
Two cases illustrate this dichotomy. In Organization for a Better
Austin v. Keefe,2"' the Supreme Court rejected a request to enjoin
demonstrations "intended to exercise a coercive impact."214 The Court
stated that coercion, without more, means simply that the speakers
"intended to influence [the listener's] conduct by their activities; this is
not fundamentally different from the function of a newspaper."2" 5
By contrast, the Court upheld an injunction against peaceful picketing
in Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co.216 Because Missouri had made
it illegal to refuse commerce with nonunion businesses, the picketing
could be enjoined as "an integral part of conduct in violation of a valid
criminal statute."217 The communicative aspect of picketing did not
prevent the injunction, the Court declared, because "it has never been
deemed an abridgment of freedom of speech or press to make a course
of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part initiated,
evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either spoken, written,
or printed."1 '

210. See Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago, Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc.,
312 U.S. 287, 293 (1941) (stating that "[pleaceful picketing is the workingman's means of
communication"); see also Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980).
211. Cox, 379 U.S. at 563; see also Hughes v. Superior Ct., 339 U.S. 460, 464 (1950)
("The Constitution does not demand that the element of communication in picketing prevail
over the mischief furthered by its use in these situations."); Carpenters & Joiners Union
of America, Local No. 213 v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722, 725 (1942) ("The petitioners now
claim that there is to be found in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
a constitutional command that peaceful picketing must be wholly immune from regulation
by the community in order to protect the general interest, that the states must be
powerless to confine the use of this industrial weapon within reasonable bounds.").
212. Milk Wagon Drivers, 312 U.S. at 293-94, 296; ClaiborneHardware, 458 U.S. at
923-24; Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131, 140 (1957) (striking down injunction
against peaceful picketing when violence was scattered in time).
213. 402 U.S. 415 (1971).
214. Id. at 419.
215. Id.
216. 336 U.S. 490, 494 (1949).
217. Id. at 498.
218. Id. at 502.
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This principle permits the enjoining of speech in the labor context
when persuasion becomes intimidation. The Supreme Court has held
that an employer may communicate freely with employees "so long as
the communications do not contain a 'threat of reprisal or force or
promise of benefit.' 219 This rule is based on the complex inter-relationship between the legitimate, but competing interests of labor and
management: "[An employer's rights cannot outweigh the equal rights
of the employees to associate freely."220
While such restrictions are permissible, the Supreme Court has not
always been precise in describing why they are not prior restraints. In
the 1994 case of Madsen v.Women's Health Center, Inc.,221 for example, the Court upheld an injunction issued against demonstrators outside
an abortion clinic in Melbourne, Florida.22 2 After an initial injunction
against blocking access to the clinic and physically abusing those
entering the clinic was violated, a second, much broader injunction was
issued. 223 Among other activities, this second injunction barred
"congregating, picketing, patrolling, [and] demonstrating ...within [36]
feet of'the clinic.224
In a dismissive footnote, the Court explained why it did not consider
this second injunction to be a prior restraint:
Not all injunctions which may incidentally affect expression, however,
are "prior restraints" . . . . Here petitioners are not prevented from

expressing their message in any one of several different ways; they are
simply prohibited from expressing it within the 36-foot buffer zone.

219. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 618 (1969).
220. Id. at 617; see also Thomas v. Collins, Sheriff, 323 U.S. 516, 537-538 (1945) ("When
to this persuasion other things are added which bring about coercion, or give it that
character, the limit of the right has been passed . ... But short of that limit the
employer's freedom cannot be impaired. The Constitution protects no less the employees'
converse right."). Thus, the reason labor speech can be subject to injunction is not, as
Justice White implied in the PentagonPaperscase, because "those enjoined... are private
parties, not the press." New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 731 (White, J., concurring).
221. 512 U.S. 753 (1994). The prior restraint reasoning of Madsen was echoed in the
1997 case Schenck v. Pro-ChoiceNetwork of Western New York, 519 U.S. 357, 374 n.6
(1997).
222. 512 U.S. at 776.
223. Id. at 759. This second injunction applied to Operation Rescue, named parties,
and "those acting in concert with them." Id. at 760.
224. Id. at 759. The second injunction also prohibited (a) between 7:30 a.m. and noon
[the time for surgical procedures and recovery periods], "singing, or .. .other sounds or
images observable to or within earshot of the patients inside the clinic"; (b) within 300 feet
of clinic "approaching any person seeking the services of the clinic unless such person
indicates a desire to communicate"; and (c) "encouraging... other persons to commit any
of the prohibited acts listed." Id. at 760.
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Moreover the injunction was issued not because of the content of
petitioners' expression, ... but because of their prior unlawful conduct.225
Thus, the Court stated, an injunction is not a prior restraint if the
speaker can communicate in some other location and if the injunction is
issued due to the speaker's prior unlawful conduct.22 s This reasoning
cannot be correct.
The first contention, permitting injunctions because the speech may
be made elsewhere, has been repeatedly rejected by the Court. In
2 27
Southeastern Promotions Ltd. v. Conrad,
the Court found the denial
of a municipal theater for a performance of the musical "Hair" to be an
unconstitutional prior restraint.228 The Court held the question of
whether there were other theaters available in town was completely
irrelevant:
Whether petitioner might have used some other, privately owned,
theater in the city for the production is of no consequence .... Even
if a privately owned forum had been available, that fact alone would
not justify an otherwise impermissible prior restraint. "[One] is not to
have the exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places
abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place."229
Thus, the Court concluded "it does not matter for purposes of this case
that the board's decision might not have had the effect of total suppression of the musical in the community. Denying use of the municipal
facility under the circumstances present here constituted the prior
restraint."230
Similarly, the fact that the demonstrators in Madsen could demonstrate in some other locale does not keep the injunction from being a
prior restraint.23 ' Under any other rule, the government could mute

225. Id. at 764 n.2.
226. Id. at 763. The Court in Madsen held a special First Amendment standard would

be applied "when evaluating a content-neutral injunction ..... [w]e must ask instead
whether the challenged provisions of the injunction burden no more speech than necessary
to serve a significant government interest." Id. at 765.
227. 420 U.S. 546 (1975).

228. Id. at 564.
229. Id. at 556 (quoting Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939)).
230. Id.
231. The Court in Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 705-06 (1986), in
permitting the closure of an adult bookstore as a nuisance because of onsite prostitution

also seemed to hold that an injunction was not a prior restraint if communication could be
conducted elsewhere: "[T]he order would impose no restraint at all on the dissemination
of particular materials, since respondents are free to carry on their bookselling business

at another location, even if such locations are difficult to find." Id. at 706 n.2. This
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its critics by barring speakers from the most effective sites for their
communications by arguing that they were not barred from "expressing
their message in any one of several different ways."232
The second part of the Madsen analysis, that an injunction issued in
response to "prior unlawful conduct" is not a prior restraint, also
contradicts both precedent and the theory behind the prior restraint
doctrine. In the foundation case of Near v. Minnesota, the Court struck
down as a prior restraint an injunction that was only applied 233
to
newspapers that had already been convicted of violating state law.
Similarly, the Court in Vance v. Universal Amusement Co. 2 34 struck
down a statute that authorized "state judges, on the basis of a showing
that obscene films have been exhibited in the past, to prohibit the future
exhibition of motion pictures that have not yet been found to be
obscene."235
Enjoining future speech is simply an impermissible penalty for "prior
unlawful conduct." Such injunctions are still prior restraint and present
the same dangers of censorship as other types of injunctions.
The improper analysis of Madsen does not necessarily mean the
injunction was unconstitutional but merely that the Court asked the
wrong question. For while mere prior unlawful conduct is not a proper
basis for injunctive relief against free expression, "[tihe First Amendment does not protect violence."236 Accordingly, the proper inquiry in
Madsen would have been to ask not whether there was prior unlawful
conduct but whether the demonstrators had previously engaged in a
pattern of extensive violence. If such a record could be established, it
would then be appropriate to "enjoin acts of picketing in themselves
peaceful [because] they are enmeshed with contemporaneously violent
conduct."237 By focusing on the law of "verbal acts," the result could

statement is not as troubling as the one in Madsen, though, because the case is easily
rationalized on the basis on the second reason the Court gave for not treating the order as
a prior restraint: "Second, the closure order sought would not be imposed on the basis of
an advance determination that the distribution of particular materials is prohibited-indeed the imposition of the closure order has nothing to do with any expressive
conduct at all." Id. Thus, Arcara can properly be read as simply holding that closing a
business, including one that sells communicative material, on account of illegal nonspeech
related activity is not a prior restraint. The reference to selling books "at another location"
is merely proof that the closure is not related to the content of those books.

232. 512 U.S. at 764.
233. 283 U.S. at 722-23. The injunction was issued only after a finding that the
newspaper had been "malicious, scandalous and defamatory." Id. at 706.
234. 445 U.S. 308 (1980).
235. Id. at 311.
236. ClaiborneHardware,458 U.S. at 916.
237. Milk Wagon Drivers Union, 312 U.S. at 292.
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have been the same without creating the risk of dangerous exceptions to
the prior restraint doctrine.
Commercial speech is another area in which the Supreme Court has
occasionally conflated the concept of prior restraints with that of verbal
acts.23 Among the many reasons the Court has given for permitting
greater regulation of commercial speech is its intermingling of speech
and conduct: "By definition, commercial speech is linked inextricably to
commercial activity: ... [and] 'the State does not lose its power to
regulate commercial activity deemed harmful to the public whenever
speech is a component of that activity. ' '
Thus, courts have repeatedly upheld orders requiring advertisers to
cease and desist communicating misleading or unsubstantiated
advertising, rejecting claims that these orders were unconstitutional
prior restraints.2" The Supreme Court has stated that the attributes
of commercial speech "may also make inapplicable the prohibition
against prior restraints."2 41 While constitutional protection is given to
truthful commercial speech concerning legal activities,242 the prior
restraint doctrine should not be part of the analysis. Accordingly, bans
on misleading advertisements or advertisements for illegal activity do
not run afoul of the First Amendment: "[Tihere can be no constitutional
objection to the suppression of commercial messages that do not
accurately inform the public about lawful activity. The government may
ban forms of communication more likely to deceive the public than to
inform it.

2 43

The Supreme Court, thus, created an unnecessary problem in prior
restraint analysis in PittsburghPress Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on
Human Relations.244 In Pittsburgh Press, the Pittsburgh Commission
on Human Relations had obtained a court order barring newspapers
from carrying help-wanted advertisements in gender-designated

238. Commercial speech is that speech which does "no more than propose a commercial
transaction." PittsburghPress Co., 413 U.S. at 385.
239. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 10 n.9 (1979) (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar
Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978)).
240. See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. FTC, 676 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1982); Jay Norris,
Inc. v. FTC, 598 F.2d 1244 (2d Cir. 1979); Murray Space Shoe Corp. v. FTC, 304 F.2d 270
(2d Cir. 1962); E.F. Drew & Co. v. FTC, 235 F.2d 735 (2d Cir. 1956).

241. VirginiaPharmacy Bd., 425 U.S. at 771-72 n.24; see also Central Hudson Gas &
Electric Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 571 n.13 (1980) ("We have observed
that commercial speech is such a sturdy brand of expression that traditional prior restraint

doctrine may not apply to it.").
242. See, e.g., Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173 (1999).

243. Central Hudson Gas, 447 U.S. at 563.
244.

413 U.S. 376 (1973).
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columns.24
In upholding this order, the Supreme Court gave an
awkward explanation for why the injunction did not involve an
impermissible prior restraint: "The special vice of a prior restraint is
that communication will be suppressed, either directly or by inducing
excessive caution in the speaker, before an adequate determination that
it is unprotected by the First Amendment."246
It is wrong to imply that the prior restraint doctrine is concerned only
with ensuring an adequate determination by a judge.247 Certainly,
such review is necessary to prevent the executive branch from operating
as ultimate censor. But the prior restraint doctrine also controls when
judges are permitted to make this adequate determination. As the Court
stated when striking down the court-imposed restriction in Nebraska
Press Ass'n, the First Amendment affords "special protection against
orders that prohibit publication or broadcast of particular information
or commentary-orders that impose a 'previous' or 'prior' restraint on
speech."2"
Similarly, in Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., 249 the
Court held the prior restraint doctrine required careful procedures for
regulating obscenity, despite "the fact that the temporary prior restraint
is entered
by a state trial judge rather than an administrative cen25
sor." 0
Rather than rely on judicial involvement to avoid finding the order an
unconstitutional prior restraint, the Court should have ruled that the
prior restraint doctrine does not apply to commercial speech advertising
illegal conduct.2 5' This option was not really available to the Court in
1973 when it decided Pittsburgh Press. The modern doctrine of
commercial speech only began in 1976 with the case of Virginia State
22
Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens' Consumer Council, Inc. 1

245. Id. at 378.
246. Id. at 390.
247. A similar implication can be found in Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544
(1993). "The constitutional infirmity in nearly all of our prior restraint cases involving
obscene material ... was that the government had seized or otherwise restrained materials
suspected of being obscene without a prior judicial determination that they were in fact so."
Id. at 551.
248. Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 556.
249. 445 U.S. 308 (1980).
250. Id. at 317.
251. In fact, a close reading of the case shows the Court did rely, to some extent, on its
conclusion that the want-ads were "classic examples of commercial speech." Pittsburgh
Press, 413 U.S. at 385. As the Court noted in PittsburghPress, because sex discrimination
in hiring is illegal, not only were the want-ads commercial speech, they were commercial
speech for illegal activities. Id. at 388.
252. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). Citing "commonsense differences between speech that does

'no more than propose a commercial transaction,' and other varieties," the Court stated
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Since Virginia Pharmacy, it has been clear that, in the words of Justice
Brennan, "traditional prior restraint principles do not fully apply to
commercial speech." 53
It is very important that the prior restraint doctrine not be imported
into the area of commercial speech. The limited prior restraint analysis
in Pittsburgh Press is a clear example of the danger of which the
Supreme Court has warned: "[T]he failure to distinguish between
commercial and noncommercial speech 'could invite dilution, simply by
a leveling process, of the force of the [First]
Amendment's guarantee
254
with respect to the latter kind of speech.'
A final issue of verbal acts involves the four privacy torts: publicity
that places the plaintiff in a false light, commercial appropriation of
name or likeness, intrusion upon seclusion, and public disclosure of
private facts. 255 Each must be discussed individually to determine
whether the connection between conduct and expression is sufficient to
permit injunctive relief without violating the principles of the prior
restraint doctrine.
The false light tort is functionally the same as defamation, and, thus,
injunctive relief would be an unconstitutional remedy.21 6 By contrast,
appropriation, by infringing the right of publicity, is functionally theft
of the commercial value in a celebrity's name or likeness, which, like the

more regulation was permissible for commercial speech than for non-commercial speech.
Id. at 771 n.24. The major differences given were "the greater objectivity and hardiness
of commercial speech." Id. at 772. Accordingly, the Court has evolved a four-part test for
regulating commercial speech. First, is the speech protected by the First Amendment?
Second, is the asserted governmental interest substantial? Third, does the regulation
directly advance the governmental interest asserted? And, finally, is the regulation more
extensive than is necessary to serve that interest? Central Hudson Gas & Electric, 447
U.S. at 566.
253. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626,668 n.13 (1985) (Brennan,
J., concurring in part); see also Central Hudson Gas & Electric, 447 U.S. at 571 n.13
(stating, "We have observed that commercial speech is such a sturdy brand of expression
that traditional prior restraint doctrine may not apply to it."); Virginia PharmacyBd., 425
U.S. at 771-772 n.24 (stating that the attributes of commercial speech "may also make
inapplicable the prohibition against prior restraints").
254. Central Hudson Gas & Elec., 447 U.S. at 563 n.5 (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State
Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978)).
255.

See Prosser, supra note 200, at 389; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§§ 652B-652E.
256. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 573 (stating that "'[tihe interest protected' in permitting
recovery for placing the plaintiff in a false light 'is clearly that of reputation, with the same
overtones of mental distress as in defamation'") (quoting Prosser, supra note 200, at 400).
See Time Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
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taking of25other
verbal property, can be enjoined without constitutional
7
difficulty.

The tort of intrusion deals with harm caused by harassing conduct
rather than the content of expression. Thus, a television camera crew
could be enjoined from invading the privacy of private individuals by
harassing, hounding, following, intruding, frightening, terrorizing, or
ambushing.25 Similarly, injunctions can be issued to stop picketing
that targets an individual's residence: "Courts are justified in drawing
a distinction between communication and physical 2 and
psychological
9
intimidation, between free speech and harassment." 1
The last privacy tort, public disclosure of private facts, has sometimes
been held to be enjoinable. 6 0 The most famous case, Commonwealth
v. Wiseman,261 involved a documentary, "Titticut Follies," which
depicted dangerous conditions at a state institution for the criminally
insane and was deemed to invade the inmates' privacy.262 An injunction prevented the public showing of the film for more than twenty
years.26 3
Other courts have held an injunction to prevent disclosure of private
facts should be treated as an unconstitutional prior restraint.2" This

257.

See Prosser, supra note 200, at 401-03.

258. Wolfson v. Lewis, 924 F. Supp. 1413, 1432 (E.D. Pa. 1996); see also Galella v.
Onassis, 353 F. Supp. 196 (S.D. N.Y. 1972), affd in part and rev'd in part, 487 F.2d 986
(2d Cir. 1973) (involving an injunction requiring photographer to maintain certain distance
from Jacqueline Onassis).
259. Hazel A. Landwehr, Unfriendly Persuasion: Enjoining Residential Picketing, 43
DUKE L.J. 148, 181 (1993). For cases upholding injunctions against targeted residential
picketing, see, e.g., Murray v. Lawson, 649 A.2d 1253, 1256 (N.J. 1994); Lambert v.
Williams, 218 A.D.2d 618, 620 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995); Kaplan v. Prolife Action League, 431
S.E.2d 828, 831 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993); Northeast Women's Ctr., Inc. v. McMonagle, 745 F.
Supp. 1082, 1090 (E.D. Pa. 1990), modified, 749 F. Supp. 695 (E.D. Pa. 1990), affd, 939
F.2d 57 (3d Cir. 1991); Boffard v. Barnes, 591 A.2d 699, 700 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1991);
Dayton Women's Health Ctr. v. Enix, 589 N.E.2d 121, 127 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991); Klebanoff
v. McMonagle, 552 A.2d 677, 678-81 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).
260. A few injunctions have been issued to prevent disclosure of private facts, but the
Supreme Court has not ruled on their constitutionality. See, e.g., Commonwealth v.
Wiseman, 249 N.E.2d 610 (Mass. 1969); Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 233 N.E.2d 840
(N.Y. 1967), prob. jur. noted, 393 U.S. 818 (1968), removed from docket after parties
settled, 393 U.S. 1046 (1969); Doe v. Roe, 42 A.D.2d 559 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973), affd, 307
N.E.2d 823 (N.Y. 1973).
261. 249 N.E.2d 610 (Mass. 1969).
262. Id. at 615.
263. An alternate ground for the injunction was that the filmmaker violated his
contractual commitment to receive valid releases from all subjects portrayed in the film.
Id. at 616.
264. See Georgia Gazette Publ'g Co. v. Ramsey, 248 Ga. 528, 530, 284 S.E.2d 386, 387
(1981); Quinn v. Johnson, 51 A.D.2d 391, 392-93 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976).
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argument is probably the stronger because the harms caused by the
disclosure of private facts and those caused by defamatory statements
are very similar. Both kinds of harm emanate solely from the content
of the speech. As the Supreme Court has stated, the purpose behind
actions both for defamation and for false light privacy is nonpecuniary
but instead focuses on protecting feelings or reputation. 265 Moreover,
cases like Wiseman and Near illustrate these injunctions pose a serious
harm to freedom of speech when they restrict the discussion of important
public issues.
B.

Exceptions to the PriorRestraint Doctrine

Even with the above exclusions, there will be a few instances when a
true prior restraint may be constitutional. The two primary areas
involve national security and obscenity. As always, to preserve the
principles and history supporting the prior restraint doctrine, these
exceptions must be carefully circumscribed.
1. The Certainties of War. A democracy must be willing to accept
the real dangers caused by speech even in war-time. As Justice
Brandeis explained, those who began our country were not "cowards"
who "exalt[ed] order at the cost of liberty."2"
Rather, they were
willing to accept the dangers from free speech unless the evil feared was
"imminent."26 7 Accordingly, even the likelihood of grave harm is not
sufficient to permit a prior restraint; the Government must prove
disclosure will "surely result in direct, immediate, and irreparable
damage to our Nation or its people."2
However, no country need accept the certain death of its soldiers. If
a broadcaster revealed the location and timing of the landing by
American troops during the Gulf War, it is an absolute certainty many
of them would have been killed. This is not mere speculation-it is a
self-evident reality of war.
Thus, the Near exception, permitting prior restraints on "the
publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number and location
of troops,"2 69 has a narrowly focused scope. It applies only when the
release of the information must inevitably cause these catastrophic
harms.27 °

265. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 576.
266.

Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).

267. Id.
268. New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring).
269. Near, 283 U.S. at 716.
270. See, e.g., New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 726 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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By neglecting to demand this proof, the court that banned The
Progressive magazine's instructions on how to make a hydrogen bomb
erroneously issued a prior restraint.27 1 Citing the "risk of thermonuclear proliferation," the judge enjoined publication of the article. 272 He
stated that while "[a] mistake in ruling against The Progressive will
seriously infringe cherished First Amendment rights,... [a] mistake in
ruling against the United States could pave the way for thermonuclear
annihilation for us all."27
The error here comes from the court's
reliance on a simplistic comparison between the severity of harms
potentially caused by the two "mistakes." If this were indeed the
appropriate constitutional inquiry, even the most speculative claims of
national security would always prevail over free speech interests.2 74
The First Amendment requires courts to use the equation first
suggested by Judge Learned Hand, determining whether "the gravity of
the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability,justifies such invasion of free
speech as is necessary to avoid the danger."2 75 In other words, it is not
simply the harm from erroneously ruling against the Government that
courts must consider but its improbability. Thus, the court should never
have issued the injunction without proof the harm would surely result.
The injunction against The Progressivewas lifted after other publications began disseminating the "instructions" contained in the article.
Subsequent events have proven thermonuclear annihilation was not the
inevitable result of publishing the information. The Progressive case
should stand as a warning to those seeking an expansive reading of the
war-time exception to prior restraints.
2. The Special Case of Obscenity. Of all the exceptions to the ban
on prior restraints listed in Near, none has resulted in more litigation
than obscenity. Likewise, none has resulted in the issuance of more
restraints.

271. United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wisc. 1979). The article
was entitled, "The H-Bomb Secret How We Got It, Why We're Telling It."
272. Id. at 995.
273. Id. at 996. He added that "In that event, our right to life is extinguished and the
right to publish becomes moot." Id.
274. Indeed, the judge issuing the injunction opined that "[flaced with a stark choice
between upholding the right to continued life and the right to freedom of the press, most
jurists would have no difficulty in opting for the chance to continue to breathe and function
as they work to achieve perfect freedom of expression." Id. at 995.
275. United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950), affd, 341 U.S. 494
(1951) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court relied on this formula in Nebraska Press
Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 562.
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Near described, as one of the few "exceptional cases" for which prior
restraints were permitted, "the primary requirements of decency ...
against obscene publications."2 7 The Court did not cite any case for
this exception nor why the harms from obscenity were different from
many of the other harms stemming from speech that was not enjoinable.
A review of the history of prior restraint reveals the English concept
of "obscene libel" was indeed treated differently from both personal libel
and seditious libel. For example, in the 1720 case of Burnett v.
Chetwood,2" the Court announced it was "proper to grant an injunction to ... restrain the printing or publishing [of] any[thing] that

contained reflections on religion or morality."27
Blackstone as well seems to imply such a distinction in his famous
discussion of prior restraints. Blackstone began by noting that libels,
"taken in their largest and most extensive sense, signify any writings,
pictures, or the like, of an immoral or illegal tendency."27 He then,
however, excluded obscene libels: "[I]n the sense under which we are
now to consider them, [libels] are malicious defamations of any person,
and especially any magistrate, made public ...in order to provoke him
280
to wrath or expose him to public hatred, contempt, and ridicule."
Thus, the modern obscenity exception can certainly be justified as
reflecting the historically different treatment of "immoral" speech. This
is surely a safer distinction than the one suggested by Justice Brennan
in the Pentagon Papers case, which "rest[ed] upon the proposition that
'obscenity is not protected by the freedoms of speech and press.' ' 28 1
The primary problem with Brennan's formulation is "[a] particular
communication cannot be authoritatively called protected or unprotected
at a point when, by definition, no court has yet determined the
constitutional question." 282 Moreover, much speech for which injunctions
have been rejected is "not protected."2 3

276. Near, 283 U.S. at 716.
277. Burnett v. Chetwood, 35 Eng. Rep. 1008 (1720) (Lord Chancellor Macclesfield),
noted in Souththey v. Sherwood, 2 Mer. 435, 441 (1817).
278. Burnett, 35 Eng. Rep. at 1009.
279. BLACKSTONE, supra note 30, at 150.
280. Id.
281. New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 727 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 481 (1957)); see also Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 590
(Brennan, J., concurring) (stating the obscenity and incitement exceptions "have since come
to be interpreted as situations in which the 'speech' involved is not encompassed within the
meaning of the First Amendment").
282. TRIBE, supra note 13, at 1047.

283. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (stating that "there
is no constitutional value in false statements of fact").
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Likewise, justification for the obscenity exception cannot be grounded
in the harm that obscenity may cause. It would surely be impossible to
compare the relative harms caused by obscenity as compared to those of
libel, invasions of privacy, or risk of impairment of a fair trial.
The current situation is to treat obscenity, for purposes of prior
restraints, as sui generis. s4 Even then, the Court has mandated a full
array of procedural safeguards "to protect against any restraint of speech
that does come within the ambit of the First Amendment."28 5 Based
on the history of prior restraint in this area and the weight of Supreme
Court precedent, this may be the most appropriate solution.
IV.

THE CONTINUING NEED FOR THE PRIOR RESTRAINT DOCTRINE

It has become virtually a constitutional clich6 to declare "prior
restraints on speech and publication are the most serious and the least
tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights."28 6 Yet, the unique
evils of prior restraints are not so self-evident that they can be taken for
granted.
For the prior restraint doctrine to be understood as serving a
significant constitutional function, the issue is not simply whether a
particular restraint harms free speech. The primary inquiry must be of
a comparative nature, asking whether prior restraints, such as licensing
systems and injunctions, are really "significantly more burdensome" on
free speech than subsequent punishments.2 7 Professors Thomas
Emerson and Vincent Blasi have led the way in detailing the special
vices of prior restraint.288 In this section, I will attempt to build on

284. See, e.g., Sanders v. Georgia, 231 Ga. 608, 612, 203 S.E.2d 153, 156 (1974) ("Free
expression is rooted deeply in our way of life and cannot be suppressed through statutes
which compromise the exercise of this freedom. This does not mean that one is free to
express obscenity. Injunctive procedures are available to stop obscene expressions.").
285. Nebraska PressAss'n, 427 U.S. at 591 (Brennan, J., concurring). For a discussion
of these protections, see supra text accompanying notes 78-82.
286. Nebraska PressAss'n, 427 U.S. at 559.
287. Blasi, supra note 5, at 26. In 1981 Professor Blasi argued that because the
criminal contempt trial is "substantially similar" to criminal prosecution, the procedures
used for penalizing violators of injunctions "cannot be the basis for linking injunctions with
licensing systems." Id. at 23. With subsequent cases such as InternationalUnion, United

Mine Workers of America v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821 (1994), criminal contempt proceedings
more and more resemble criminal prosecutions. Among the common provisions are a ban
on double jeopardy; rights to receive notice of charges, assistance of counsel, and summary
process and to present a defense; the privilege against self-incrimination; the right to proof

beyond a reasonable doubt; and, for criminal contempts involving imprisonment of more
than six months, the right to jury trial. Thus, the special nature of contempt proceedings
is no longer the strongest argument against prior restraints.
288. See Emerson, supra note 10, at 648; Blasi, supra note 5.
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their work to catalog the major reasons the barriers against prior
restraint must remain forever high.289
A.

Altering the Outcome

One of the questions raised by those skeptical of the prior restraint
doctrine is whether any of the great First Amendment victories would
have been lost but for the prior restraint doctrine. For example, Near
itself easily could have been decided on overbreadth grounds; the
Minnesota law prohibiting the publishing of a "malicious, scandalous or
defamatory newspaper,"2 9 ° obviously banned much constitutionally
protected speech.
For the prior restraint doctrine to matter, in the words of Professor
Jeffries, courts must identify the "testing case," that is, an instance "in
which speech is concededly ... outside the substantive protection of the
29 1
First Amendment but assertedly within the ban of prior restraint."
Although there are numerous significant nonsubstantive aspects to the
way courts deal with prior restraints that are worthy of special
protection, 292 it is worthwhile to recognize those cases in which the
outcome is altered because the restriction is labeled a prior restraint.
The most common case in which the ban on prior restraint protects
"unprotected" speech is the prohibition on enjoining defamatory
statements. Despite the arguments of those who assert the equitable
limitation on injunctive relief is outdated,293 the constitutional prohibition has prevented injunctive relief from being awarded to successful
defamation plaintiffs. This prohibition of injunctive relief furthers First
Amendment goals because it prevents judges from assuming a censorial
role over the future speech of those previously found to have uttered a
libelous statement. Such a speaker would never be sure whether further

289. Because I am focusing on prior restraints in general, I will not discuss in detail
one concern limited to administrative prior restraints: the effect of a censor's personality
and job description on the restriction of free speech. See, e.g., Redish, supra note 8, at 7677 ("Nonjudicial administrative regulators of expression exist for the sole purpose of
regulating; this is their raison d'etre. They simultaneously perform the functions of
prosecutor and adjudicator and, if only subconsciously, will likely feel the obligation to
justify their existence by finding some expression constitutionally subject to regulation.");
Emerson, supra note 10, at 658 ("No adequate study seems to have been made of the
psychology of licensers, censors, security officials, and their kind, but common experience
is sufficient to show that their attitudes, drives, emotions, and impulses all tend to carry

them to excesses.").
290. Near, 283 U.S. at 712.
291. Jeffries, supra note 5, at 411.

292. Id. at 416.
293. See generally Roscoe Pound, EquitableReliefAgainst Defamation,29 HARv. L. REv
640 (1916).
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comment on the previous controversy would violate an injunction and
might well choose to avoid discussion altogether.
Moreover, injunctive relief would permit plaintiffs who suffer no
economic damage to prevail in cases when they otherwise would have
received only nominal damage, if the cases would have been brought at
all. The opportunity to silence an opponent would encourage more libel
litigation and expand the tort from one limited to protecting reputation
to one in which judges are invited to determine which combatant in a
public controversy they believe is telling the truth. Thus, injunctive
relief generally is unavailable for libel plaintiffs, even those seeking to
silence statements previously adjudged to be libelous.
A related area in which "unprotected" speech cannot be enjoined
concerns invasions of privacy.294 As with defamation, invasions of
privacy are properly actionable in suits for damages, but enabling judges
to silence speakers would create the possibility of limiting discussion of
important public issues and would permit the prospect of potential harm
to overwhelm the carefully created limits of the cause of action.
Another "testing case" in which the protections of the prior restraint
doctrine were essential for the protections of the First Amendment was
the PentagonPaperscase. Even though it could be argued the Government never proved the need for any relief against the newspapers, it is
undeniable that two of the six justices making up the majority, Justices
White and Stewart, ruled against the Government "only because of the
concededly extraordinary protection against prior restraints enjoyed by
the press under our constitutional system."295 As they both clearly
implied they would support subsequent punishment against the
newspapers,2 adding their votes to the three already in favor of the
Government's position would have spelled defeat for the newspapers.
Finally, even though not precisely within the earlier definition of the
"testing case," the procedural protections the Court has included in the
prior restraint doctrine must be acknowledged. By placing the burdens
on the Government, not only of proof but of obtaining speedy judicial
review, the Court has prevented much protected speech from being
silenced along with unprotected speech. Whether these "sensitive tools"
would have been mandated but for the prior restraint doctrine is

294. See, e.g., Georgia Gazette Publ'g Co. v. Ramsey, 248 Ga. 528, 284 S.E.2d 386
(1981); Quinn v. Johnson, 381 N.Y.S.2d 875 (App. Div. 1976). Contra Commonwealth v.
Wiseman, 249 N.E.2d 610 (Mass. 1969).
295. New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 730-31 (White, J., concurring).
296. See id. at 737 (stating, "I would have no difficulty in sustaining convictions.., on
facts that would not justify the intervention of equity and the imposition of a prior
restraint.").
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'
unknown. 97
But it was the specter of the licensor that motivated the
Court. Accordingly, even though "unprotected" speech, such as
obscenity, can be attacked either through a prior restraint or subsequent
punishment, the procedural safeguards of the prior restraint doctrine
have proven to be an invaluable means of protecting "protected" speech.

B.

Restraining the Censor
One of the concerns with both licensing schemes and injunctions is the
ease with which the censorial decision can be made, enabling an overly
enthusiastic or biased decision-maker to go unchecked. As Professor
Emerson wrote, "A government official thinks longer and harder before
deciding to undertake the serious task of subsequent punishment-the
expenditure of time, funds, energy, and personnel that will be necessary.
Under a system of prior restraints, he can reach the result by a simple
stroke of the pen."29
Not only does the ease of issuing a prior restraint encourage the
issuance of restraints, some have argued knowledge that one's speech
can be silenced so easily by a government official will lead to excessive
self-censorship. However, as Professor Blasi pointed out, this is not an
exclusive property of prior restraints because fear of governmental bias
"can also cause self-censorship under the subsequent punishment
regimes. 299
Nonetheless, prior restraints do pose a unique danger regarding both
ease of issuance and governmental bias. This danger is best understood
by reference to separation of powers principles. Government officials
from any branch are always capable of feeling biased against a
particular speaker, and any law, be it prior restraint or subsequent
punishment, infringes freedom of speech when it permits officials to act
on their biases. The genius behind separating powers, though, is that
more than one official must feel this bias before a speaker is penalized.
It is possible that all three branches of government will want to silence
a particular point of view and no system of government could prevent
this occurrence. Fortunately, these moments are far rarer than the
cases of the petty tyrant, the angry city council, or the prejudiced judge.
Requiring more than one branch to act is not a perfect safeguard, but it
is a significant one.
Similarly, the separation of powers principle also counteracts the
"stroke of the pen" scenario. A potential censor knows more than one

297. See generally Speiser, 357 U.S. at 525.
298. See Emerson, supra note 10, at 657.
299. Blasi, supra note 5, at 35.
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step is needed and there is always a possibility the other branches will
not share the prejudice or enthusiasm of the censor. Thus, "a decision
to suppress in advance is usually more readily reached, on the same
facts, than a decision to punish after the event." 00
C. Personalizationand Equal Protection
A related harm from prior restraints is the personalized nature of the
governmental action. Not only does this increase the likelihood of selfcensorship, but it permits encroachments on equal protection principles.
Unlike subsequent punishments, which begin with laws or regulations
applicable to all potential speakers, prior restraints, whether by license
or injunction, identify the individual speaker prior to the speech. The
personalization inherent in any system of prior restraints gives the
government the ability to violate the equal protection norm inherent in
the First Amendment.3 1 This norm requires equal treatment for all
speakers, regardless of the content of their messages.30 2 Subsequent
punishments can be imposed based only on violations of laws of general
applicability. Prior restraints, by contrast, can be imposed specifically
on disfavored individuals.
Moreover, it is often impossible to prove a prior restraint system is
being operated in a discriminatory fashion. With such a system, "post
hoc rationalizations by the licensing official and the use of shifting or
illegitimate criteria are far too easy, making it difficult for courts to
determine in any particular case whether the licensor is permitting
favorable, and suppressing unfavorable, expression."3 3
Permitting judges to impose injunctions on speech creates the same
possibility of unprovable suppression of unfavorable expression. Under
such a system, "speech may be quashed, or not quashed, in the discretion

300. Emerson, supra note 10, at 657.
301. See generally Kenneth Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First
Amendment, 43 U: CHI. L. REV. 20 (1976); see also Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408
U.S. 92, 96 (1972) (striking down on equal protection grounds a ban on picketing that
exempted labor picketing because the government "may not select which issues are worth
discussing or debating in public facilities"); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 459 (1980)
(striking down a law that "selectively proscrib[ed] peaceful picketing on the basis of the
placard's message").
302. See, e.g., Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47 (1966) (permitting trespass
conviction for demonstration outside jail because "[tihere is no evidence at all that on any

other occasion had similarly large groups of the public been permitted to gather on this
portion of the jail grounds for any purpose").
303. City of Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 758.
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of a single official, who necessarily knows the content and viewpoint of
the speech subject to the injunction."3"
Whether phrased as a ban on content-based regulation or a guarantee
of equal protection, freedom of expression requires that speakers be
treated similarly, regardless of viewpoint. Because any system of prior
restraint makes discriminatory treatment both easy to impose and
difficult to detect, "'the danger of censorship and of abridgment of our
precious First Amendment freedoms is too great' to be permitted." 30 5
D.

The CollateralBar Rule and the Cost of Delay

One of the most pernicious features of injunctions against speech is
the collateral bar rule. Unlike a law, which can be violated and still be
challenged as unconstitutional, an unconstitutional injunction must be
obeyed until overturned by an appellate court.
In Walker v. City of Birmingham,"' the Supreme Court upheld a
finding of contempt against civil rights demonstrators who disobeyed an
injunction barring them from marching without permission. 3 7 Even
though the law under which the injunction was granted was later found
to be unconstitutional, the Court stated the demonstrators had no right
to ignore the injunction.3 0 ' As the Court has since remarked, "persons
subject to an injunctive order issued by a court with jurisdiction are
or reversed, even if they
expected to obey that decree until it is modified
30 9
have proper grounds to object to the order."
Under the collateral bar rule, an improper injunction against speech
will have one of two immediate results: either it will be obeyed, and
protected speech will be silenced during the time of appeal, or it will be
violated, and the speaker will be punished for uttering protected

304. Lawson v. Murray, 515 U.S. 1110, 1114 (1995), denial of cert. (Scalia, J.,
concurring). Justice Scalia argued that an injunction on peaceful residential picketing by
anti-abortion protesters should be struck down as an unconstitutional prior restraint,
especially because "[tihe New Jersey courts have given equitable relief against residential
picketing not violative of state law only in this case and another recent case involving
abortion protestors." Id. at 1111, 1114.
305. Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 131 (1992) (quoting
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 553 (1975)).
306. 388 U.S. 307 (1967).

307. Id. at 320-21.
308. Id. at 317-21.
309. GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumers Union, 445 U.S. 375, 386 (1980); see also Howat
v. Kansas, 258 U.S. 181, 189-90 (1922) (stating an injunction must be obeyed "however
erroneous the action of the court may be, even if the error be in the assumption of the
validity of a seeming, but void law going to the merits of the case").
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speech.31 ° This problem was summarized by Alexander Bickel with the
aphorism, "where a criminal statute chills, prior restraint freezes." 11
This is an intolerable situation many have recognized as a fundamental
evil of injunctions against speech.312
In fact, in many ways, contempt prosecutions for violating injunctions
are eerily similar to the seditious libel trial of John Peter Zenger. In
both, the only question is whether the speech was uttered in violation of
governmental edict. The propriety of the edict itself must remain above
questioning.
The only safe recourse is to obey the injunction and be silenced.3"3
Due to this delay, the speech either "never reaches the marketplace at
all" or "may have become obsolete or unprofitable."3 4 It is certainly
true not all delays will be significant.315 But, it is even more true that
government cannot be trusted to determine the importance of the
timeliness of any particular item of news.31 '
Some lower courts have held that a "transparently invalid" injunction
can be ignored and then challenged.3 7 The Supreme Court, though,
has never utilized this exception to permit a violated injunction to be
challenged. Moreover, the upholding of the injunction in the Noriega

310. As Professor Blasi noted, "Enjoined speakers must hold their tongues while they
move to have the injunction vacated or modified." Blasi, supra note 5, at 32.
311. ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 61 (1975).
312. Redish, supra note 8, at 93-99. Other prominent scholars who have discussed the
harms caused by the collateral bar rule include Professors Owen M. Fiss and Stephen
Barnett. See, e.g., CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 30, Indiana Univ. Press (1978); Barnett, The
Puzzle of PriorRestraint, 29 STAN. L. REv. 539, 553 (1977).
313. The power of an injunction can be seen in its effectiveness. The New York Times
and The Washington Post delayed their publication of the Pentagon Papers, and The
Progressive magazine withheld publication of the H-bomb story.
314. See Emerson, supra note 10, at 657. As the Court described in Bridges v.
California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941), the practical effect of judicial restrictions on the discussion
of a trial would be that "anyone who might wish to give public expression to his views on
a pending case involving no matter what problem of public interest, just at the time his
audience would be most receptive, would be as effectively discouraged as if a deliberate
statutory scheme of censorship had been adopted." Id. at 269.
315. See, e.g., Blasi, supra note 5, at 66 (stating that "the costs of delay are highly
variable, and should not be uncritically assumed").
316. Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 561. As the Supreme Court recognized, albeit in an
understated way, "the element of time is not unimportant if press coverage is to fulfill its
traditional function of bringing news to the public promptly." Id.
317. Providence Journal Co., 820 F.2d 1342, 1344 (1986) modified on reh'g by 820 F.2d
1354 (1st Cir. 1986).
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case should make one wonder whether even the most outrageous
injunction is "transparently invalid."31
E. Abstract Facts and Speculative Harms
To Professor Blasi, one of the most harmful aspects of a prior restraint
is it required "adjudication in the abstract." 1 ' Whether it be by
injunction or permit denial, the decision to impose a prior restraint is
made before the communication occurs. Thus, any evaluation of the
harms associated with particular speech "must be made in the abstract,
based on speculation or generalizations embodied in presumptions."32 °
This is indeed a serious problem. Risk-adverse judges or licensors are
apt to err on the side of caution, not on the side of free speech. 2 1
After all, if a speaker is silenced, it is impossible to prove no harm would
have resulted. If speech is permitted and trouble ensues, all know at
whom to point the finger of blame.
Another aspect of the speculation problem is the judge or licensor often
must speculate over what the speaker will actually say. As the Court
has noted, "It is always difficult to know in advance what an individual
will say, and the line between legitimate and illegitimate speech is often
drawn that the risks of freewheeling censorship are formidaso finely
22
3

ble."

By contrast, subsequent punishments can be imposed only after the
speech is communicated. Not only does this allow a far more accurate
assessment of whether the speech was truly dangerous, it permits the
public to protect the speaker who was truly effective. 3 As has been
true since colonial times, when the Government seeks to punish the most
effective speakers, it runs the risk that the people will see this as
punishment for eloquence, not criminality.

318.

The Court in Walker, in upholding the finding of contempt, stated that "this is not

a case where the injunction was transparently invalid or had only a frivolous pretense to
validity." Walker, 388 U.S. at 315. The Supreme Court has yet to find such a case. For
a discussion of the Noriega case, see supra text accompanying notes 62-68.
319. Blasi, supra note 5, at 49.
320. Id.
321. See generally id. at 52 (stating that "judges tend to be unduly risk-adverse").
322. Southeastern PromotionsLtd., 420 U.S. at 559. In SoutheasternPromotions, the
musical "Hair" was barred from a municipal theater, even though "neither the [licensing]
Board nor the lower courts could have known precisely the extent of nudity or simulated
sex in the musical, or even that either would appear, before the play was actually
performed." Id. at 561.
323. As Professor Blasi argued, "On balance, speakers who prove to be persuasive and
attractive are likely to fare better as a result of the dynamics of subsequent punishment."
Blasi, supra note 5, at 53.
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Aesthetics and PriorRestraint
Another problem with prior restraint is less in its direct impact on
speech than in what might be called its aesthetic harm. The principle
that a free government should not stop its citizens from expressing their
opinions is a core value for Americans. To permit such restrictions, in
the words of one commentator, would be to miss "the music
of the First
324
Amendment and of the doctrine against prior restraint."
Professor Emerson saw this problem in almost spiritual terms. He
wrote that a system of prior restraint "implies a ... willingness to

conform to official opinion and a sluggishness or timidity in asserting
rights that bodes ill for a spirited and healthy expression of unorthodox
and unaccepted opinion. "325

Professor Blasi similarly asserted that a philosophy permitting prior
restraints was based on unacceptable premises.326 Prior restraints, for
example, imply "that the activity of disseminating controversial
communications is abnormally hazardous or disruptive, and hence
represents a threat to, rather than an integral feature of, the social
order."3 27 Additionally, "to trust the censor more than the audience is
to alter the relationship between the state
and citizen that is central to
3 2

the philosophy of limited government."

1

The aesthetic argument is based on neither legal precedent nor
detailed history. Nonetheless, it reflects the intangible value derived
from being able to declare that in our country we fear censors more than
speech and trust the people more than the government. It makes one
just a little prouder to know that we do not do prior restraints.
G. The Framers'Intent and the Benefits of an Easy Case
Even among those who argue most strenuously for the importance of
preserving the prior restraint doctrine, there is one final significant
benefit that is usually overlooked. Because the protection against prior
restraint is not merely essential for free expression but was so understood by the framers of the Constitution, the prior restraint doctrine has
the effect of producing easy cases for hard times. 29

324.

Steven Helle, Prior Restraint By the Backdoor: Conditional Rights, 39 VILL. L.

REV. 817, 874 (1994).
325. Emerson, supra note 10, at 659.
326. Blasi, supra note 5, at 85.
327. Id.
328. Id. at 73.
329. I have adopted the concept of "easy cases" from Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases,
58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399 (1985).
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First Amendment cases can be difficult for a variety of reasons.
Sometimes, a new means of communication presents novel problems that
have not been previously addressed.3 0 Other times, there will be
disagreement over the value of specific expression 3. or the importance
of competing values threatened by the expression.332 Additional
problems arise with new approaches either of regulating speech or of
dealing with the noncommunicative aspect of expressive conduct."
But issues of prior restraints are simple. As the Supreme Court has
stated, "[Wihen we do have evidence that a particular law would have
offended the Framers, we have not hesitated to invalidate it on that
ground alone. 33 4 There is, in fact, universal agreement that prior
restraints would have deeply offended the Framers and that one of the
major objectives of the First Amendment was "to prevent all such
previous restraint8 upon publications as had been practiced by other
governments."3 5 Thus, we can declare with confidence that "the
Framers in 1791 believed [freedom from prior restraint]
sufficiently
36
valuable to deserve the protection of the Bill of Rights."
What this confidence provides is the rare potential for an easy case.
Speakers, lawyers, and judges can all know it is fundamentally unAmerican to judge speech before it is given, whether by discretionary
license or injunction.

330. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (internet); Red Lion Broad. Co. v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (broadcasting); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495
(1952) (movies); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (loud speakers).
331. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996) (commercial
speech); FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (indecency).
332. See, e.g., Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (reputation of a private figure); Texas
v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (preservation of flag as symbol of national unity).
333. See, e.g., Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544 (1993) (forfeiture of assets of
bookstore); Buckley v. Valeo, 425 U.S. 946 (1976) (campaign spending as speech); United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (outlawing the burning of draft cards).
334. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575,
584 n.6 (1983).
335. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907). See Minneapolis Star & Tribune
Co., 460 U.S. at 584 n.6 ("Prior restraints, for instance, clearly strike to the core of the
Framers' concerns, leading this Court to treat them as particularly suspect.").
336. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 370 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring). Justices Thomas and Scalia share the view that the First Amendment should
be interpreted based on "the intent of those who drafted and ratified it."). Id.; see also id.
at 372 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that "the Constitution bears its original meaning and
is unchanging"). This view has not been accepted by a majority of the Court, which will
"ordinarily simply apply those general principles [of free speech], requiring the government
to justify any burdens on First Amendment rights by showing that they are necessary to
achieve a legitimate overriding governmental interest." MinneapolisStar & Tribune, 460
U.S. at 583 n.6.
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The temptation to regulate opposition speech can strike any government. In turbulent times, the desire to suppress can combine with the
legitimate interest in preserving the peace to induce those with power
to attempt to silence potentially offending speech. A clear, understandable prior restraint doctrine, with its impeccable historical lineage and
simple directive that government officials must permit speech to be
communicated, will both deter attempts to impose censorship and permit
courts to halt, quickly and efficiently, any such attempt before it works
its irremediable harm.
V.

CONCLUSION

While the Supreme Court constitutionalized the doctrine of prior
restraint since Near, it failed to provide a working definition of the term.
Such a definition is not possible, though, without incorporating the
concept of separation of powers. Because the problem of prior restraint
can be caused by different branches of government, the differing natures
of each branch must be considered as well.
With this more complete view of the meaning of prior restraint, it
becomes clear that the Supreme Court was correct in Near when it held
33 7
an injunction against speech should be treated as a prior restraint.
Further, this study reveals the real reasons some restraints should be
treated as exclusions from or exceptions to the prior restraint doctrine.
With a usable definition of prior restraints finally in place, the future of
the First Amendment can include the lessons of what has gone before:
"The favorite idea in England and America has been that every person
may freely publish what it sees fit, and any judgment of the law upon
it shall be reserved til afterwards."3"'

337. Near, 283 U.S. at 713.
338. State ex. rel Liversey v. Judge of Civil Dist. Ct., 34 La. Ann. 741, 743 (La. 1882)
(quoting ABBOTS LAW DICTIONARY "Liberty of the Press").
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